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INTRODUCTION
Minnesota courts have inundated practitioners with educa-
tion case law in recent years. The creation of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals in 1983 led to much of the exposure. Previ-
ously, the overburdened Minnesota Supreme Court decided
many school law appeals by summary affirmance. Practitioners
were left without significant case law interpreting relevant stat-
utes or developing the common law.
The eruption began in 1982. Since then, numerous cases
from the court of appeals and the supreme court have emerged
without an organized digest of resulting trends and changes.
This Article serves that purpose by sifting the judicial opinions
into appropriate categories and summarizing the state of the
law.
This Article analyzes six major topics: tort liability, compul-
sory education, open meeting laws and school closings, hiring
and firing issues, arbitration, and appeal and damages. It
presents salient Minnesota case law written during the last four
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years. The reader is exposed to recent developments and is
alerted to unanswered questions.
I. TORT LIABILITY
Minnesota cases regarding a school district's tort liability
deal generally with two areas. The first addresses the school
district's standard of care and elaborates upon the circum-
stances under which a school district will be held liable for cer-
tain torts. The second area of cases addresses a school
district's liability for the torts of its teachers and under what
circumstances a school district will be required to defend and
indemnify the torts of its teachers.
A. Standard of Care
The most recent definitive statement on a school district's
standard of care in the protection of its students is contained in
Verhel v. Independent School District No. 709.' In Verhel, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that a school district had the duty
to supervise the bannering activity of its cheerleading squad.2
The case arose out of an automobile accident in which several
cheerleaders were injured.3
The plaintiff in Verhel was a cheerleader at Denfeld High
School in Duluth, Minnesota.4 Denfeld's opening game of the
football season was to be held on Saturday night, August 30,
1980. 5 Classes did not start until the following week.6
Although the cheerleaders' schedule and constitution required
them to practice three times per week during the summer
months, the school district did not hire a teacher to supervise
1. 359 N.W.2d 579 (Minn. 1984). Justice Simonett dissented in part and was
joined by Justices Peterson, Kelley, and Coyne. Id. at 593 (Simonett, J., dissenting in
part).
2. Id. at 589.
3. A van driven by 17-year-old Karen Pitoscia and carrying 12 Denfeld High
School cheerleaders and another student collided with ajeep driven by John House
at the intersection of 59th Avenue West and Grand Avenue in West Duluth, Minne-
sota. Id. at 584. Pitoscia was thrown from the van, as was House from hisjeep. Id. at
585. Cheerleader Robin Verhel sustained the most serious injuries. She underwent
surgery to correct multiple fractures of the pelvic area, a fractured right femur and a
partially collapsed lung. Id. She sued the school district, Pitoscia and her father,
House, and Diane Williams, the faculty supervisor. Id. at 583.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 584.
6. Id.
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the cheerleaders during these months. 7
Sometime in August, the cheerleaders decided to banner the
football players' homes.8 During the middle of the night
before the game, a 17-year-old cheerleader drove a group of
cheerleaders to various houses.9 At about 5:00 a.m., the driver
rolled through a stop sign and had an accident with another
vehicle, injuring plaintiff Robin Verhel and others.' 0
The matter was tried to a jury which apportioned fault 35%
to the school district, 0% to the faculty supervisor, 26% to the
other vehicle's driver, 39% to the van's driver, and 0% to
plaintiff and plaintiff's father." The jurors found the damages
were $200,200 to Robin Verhel and $14,000 to her father.
12
On appeal, the school district argued it did not have a legal
duty to supervise the cheerleaders' bannering activities be-
cause bannering was not specifically approved or sponsored by
the school district and took place off of school premises, dur-
ing summer vacation, on a weekend in the early morning
hours. 13
Citing Sheehan v. St. Peter's Catholic School,' 4 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held the school district had a duty to supervise
7. Id. at 583-84. Faculty supervisor Diane Williams was not required by her
school district contract to meet with the cheerleading squad during the summer. Id.
She did attend a few practices voluntarily, but her primary contact with the cheer-
leaders during that time was through the two squad captains. Id. at 584. Testimony
differed regarding Williams' involvement with the bannering activity surrounding the
accident. The cheerleaders alleged Williams was present at the organizational meet-
ing and made no comment. Williams testified she heard only an offhand remark
about bannering and made no inquiry. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 584-85. Verhel was seated in the middle of the van's first bench seat
and was pinned there until removed by emergency personnel an hour after the acci-
dent. Id. at 585. She suffered pelvic fractures not normally correctable by surgery
and is now predisposed to lower back pain. Id. at 591. Verhel's right leg injury
caused an 8% permanent partial impairment. Her ability to perform physical activity
was substantially reduced. Id.
11. Id. at 585.
12. Id. at 583, 585.
13. Id. at 586. The school district argued, if it were found liable, a duty would be
imposed on it to maintain the safety of "all students while in transit to or from a
school activity." Id. The supreme court found imposition of that duty was not at
issue and "clearly a school district is not so liable." Id.
14. 291 Minn. 1, 188 N.W.2d 868 (1971). In Sheehan, a student's eye was injured
by a pebble thrown by another student. The jury awarded plaintiff $50,000 finding
the injury was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the school's failure to supervise.
The supreme court affirmed. Id. at 2, 188 N.W.2d at 869.
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the cheerleaders' bannering activities. t 5 The supreme court
reiterated the school district's standard of care, stating that the
school district had a duty to:
[u]se ordinary care and to protect its students from injury
resulting from the conduct of other students under circum-
stances where such conduct would reasonably have been
foreseen and could have been prevented by the use of ordi-
nary care. There is no requirement of constant supervision
of all the movements of pupils at all times.
16
The court stated that although a teacher "is not required to
anticipate the hundreds of unexpected student acts which oc-
cur daily or to guard against dangers inherent in rash student
acts, 17 . . . [r]ecovery is allowed in Minnesota if the jury can
find from the evidence 'that supervision would probably have
prevented the accident.' "18
The school district's liability arose from their undertaking to
supervise cheerleading in the school district. Specifically, the
court stated, "A school district's authority springs from its ex-
ercise or assumption of supervision and control over a student
organization and its activities by appropriate agents of the
school district. " 19
The court went on to hold that since the school district as-
sumed control over the cheerleading activities, the district had
an obligation to supervise those activities in their entirety no
matter when and where they occurred. 20
The school district in Verhel also claimed the accident was
not reasonably foreseeable or proximately caused by their fail-
ure to supervise the cheerleaders. 21 In resolving the proxi-
15. Verhel, 359 N.W.2d at 586.
16. Id. (quoting Sheehan, 291 Minn. at 3, 188 N.W.2d at 870).
17. Id.; see, e.g., Morris v. Oritz, 103 Ariz. 119, 437 P.2d 652 (1968).
18. Verhel, 359 N.W.2d at 586 (quoting Sheehan, 291 Minn. at 5, 188 N.W.2d at
871).
19. Id.
20. The court stated, "Where a school district has assumed control and supervi-
sion of all activities of a school club operated under its auspices, parents of partici-
pants have a right to rely upon that assumption. Id. at 587. The supreme court
found the school district had assumed control of the cheerleading squad as a school-
approved organization whereby a paid supervisor was responsible for supervising
transportation arrangements. Id. The court found the school district's responsibility
continued during the summer months given approval of the cheerleader's constitu-
tion which required summer practice and meetings and cheering at the opening foot-
ball game which was scheduled prior to the school year. Id. at 588.
21. Id. at 589.
1987]
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mate cause issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court again relied
upon Sheehan, stating:
Sheehan requires that the school district exercise ordinary
care to prevent foreseeable misconduct of other students.
Thus, although the school district might not be liable for
sudden, unanticipated misconduct of fellow students, it is
liable for sudden, foreseeable misconduct which probably
could have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care.
• . . [P]roximate causation is established by showing the
likelihood that the misconduct would have been prevented
had the duty been discharged.
22
The supreme court stated the van driver's behavior was fore-
seeable and could have been prevented if the school district's
duty had been discharged.
23
The court's holding and standards set forth in Verhel are con-
sistent with past cases.24 A school district must use ordinary
care to prevent injury resulting from the conduct of its stu-
dents. Although there is no requirement of constant supervi-
sion of all students at all times, recovery will be available if the
evidence indicates that supervision probably would have pre-
vented the accident.
A duty of reasonable care also applies when a school district
places dangerous instrumentalities into a student's hands. In
Fallin v. Maplewood-North St. Paul District No. 622,25 a student
was injured using a table saw. In discussing the school dis-
trict's duty, the court of appeals stated, "School districts have a
duty to protect their students. A school district must be espe-
cially cautious when placing highly dangerous equipment, such
as table saws, at the use of the students." 26 Upon review, the
22. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Raleigh v. Independent School Dist. No. 625, 275
N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn. 1978)).
23. Id. at 590. The court stated a supervisor would have intervened if the van's
driver was too tired or too pressured to drive safely. Id. The court also held the van
driver's failure to stop at the intersection's stop sign was not a superseding cause.
"Such behavior, or misbehavior, by unsupervised students is to be expected and is
precisely the harm to be guarded against by the exercise of the school district's su-
pervision." Id. Such conduct was foreseeable and therefore not superseding. Id.
24. See, e.g., Raleigh, 275 N.W.2d 572; Sheehan, 291 Minn. 1, 188 N.W.2d 868.
25. 362 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1985), rev'g 348 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
In Fallin, a student's thumb became caught in a table saw blade when the wood he
was sawing "kicked back." Id. at 320. The student was not using an available "anti-
kickback" device and, at the time of the accident, his teacher was not in the room. Id.
His thumb was partially amputated. Id. Ajury found the school district not negligent
and the supreme court ultimately affirmed. See id. at 319-20.
26. Fallin, 348 N.W.2d at 813-14 (emphasis added).
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Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that school districts are
held to a standard of reasonable care. 27 A higher standard
does not exist regarding dangerous equipment.
28
In Hamilton v. Independent School District No. 1]4,29 the court of
appeals found that a school district's duty to supervise stu-
dents also protects members of the public who are not stu-
dents. In Hamilton, the plaintiff was injured when a student
pushed another student who, in turn, fell against the plaintiff.
30
The plaintiff sustained serious injuries to her hip.31 The court
of appeals reversed the trial court's granting of summary judg-
ment, stating:
A school district is required to exercise ordinary care to pre-
vent foreseeable misconduct of students. In order to re-
cover damages, a plaintiff need only prove that a general
danger was foreseeable and supervision would have pre-
vented the accident. Proximate causation is established by
showing the likelihood that the misconduct would have
been prevented had the duty been discharged.
32
The court of appeals held causation to be a question for the
jury and that reasonable supervision could have prevented the
sudden injury by interrupting the misconduct or deterring it
altogether. 33 Thus, a school district's duty extends to the gen-
27. Fallin, 362 N.W.2d at 321-22. To the extent the court of appeals' statement
that a school district need be "especially cautious" was an attempt to charter a new
and higher standard of care, the supreme court overruled the intermediate court. Id.
28. Id. at 321. The supreme court found no case law to support a higher stan-
dard of care, but cited several cases supporting a duty of reasonable care. See, e.g.,
Matteucci v. High School Dist. No. 208, 4 Ill. App. 3d 710, 713, 281 N.E.2d 383, 386
(1972) (instructor must exercise due care in instructing and supervising students us-
ing dangerous wood shop machines); Tiemann v. Independent School Dist. No. 740,
331 N.W.2d 250, 251 (Minn. 1983) (standard of reasonable care required to deter-
mine whether teacher and school district negligent in using vaulting horses with ex-
posed holes); Raleigh, 275 N.W.2d at 576 (duty of ordinary care required to protect
students from foreseeable misconduct of other students during school-sponsored
showing of documentary film where student's wrist slashed and purse stolen); Kings-
ley v. Independent School Dist. No. 2, 312 Minn. 572, 574-75, 251 N.W.2d 634, 635
(1977) (school owes duty of reasonable care to inspect and maintain its premises and
equipment to protect students from risk of harm where student injured from school
locker); Kiser v. Snyder, 21 N.C. App. 708, 713, 205 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1974) (teacher
subject to ordinary prudent person standard in warning students of risks involved
when using metal shearing machine).
29. 355 N.W.2d 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
30. Id. at 183. The incident occurred when spectators were leaving a school bas-
ketball game. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
33. Id. The pushing incident was a result of a feud between the involved 13-year-
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eral public and not only to the students under its supervision.
In Tiemann v. Independent School District No. 740,34 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court reversed a trial court's granting of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the school district and held that the
question of the school district's negligence was one that should
be determined by a jury.35 In Tiemann, a student was injured
while performing a gymnastics exercise on a vaulting horse.
The handles had been removed from the vaulting horse leav-
ing four large exposed holes. 36 The student's finger became
stuck in one of the holes while performing a vault, and she was
severely injured.37 The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the school district because the practice of removing
the handles from a vaulting horse was common in the
schools.38 The supreme court reversed that portion of the trial
court's finding and held, "A negligent act will not be excused
by the fact that it is customary." 39
The Minnesota Court of Appeals faced an unusual situation
in Christopherson v. Independent School District No. 284.40 In Chris-
topherson, a student was injured while walking between two
school buses. The driver of a school bus accidentally let his
foot slip off the clutch causing the bus to lurch forward and pin
the student between the buses.4' The student was taken to the
hospital and was treated for leg injuries. 42 The student re-
quired three reconstructive surgeries on her leg for the punc-
old students. About two weeks earlier, the students were involved in a shoving match
at a basketball game after which the bullying student was reported to the supervising
teacher. Id. at 184. The court of appeals remanded the matter, finding a fact issue
on causation existed providing the jury with the question whether the supervisor
could have acted to prevent the push which injured the plaintiff. Id. at 185.
34. 331 N.W.2d 250 (Minn. 1983) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 251. Summary judgment in favor of the supervising teacher was also
reversed. The supreme court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the manufac-
turer of the vaulting horse involved in the accident because of insufficient evidence of
negligence. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Scattergood v. Keil, 233 Minn. 340, 343, 45 N.W.2d 650, 653
(1951)). The supreme court did not decide whether permitted use of the vaulting
horse with holes exposed was necessarily negligent, nor whether the supervising
teacher had failed to place sufficient matting around the horse. Those questions
were remanded to the jury. Id.
40. 354 N.W.2d 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
41. Id. at 846.
42. Id.
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ture wound caused when she was trapped between the two
school buses.
43
At the time of the accident, the student was instructed not to
use or exercise her leg.44 Without consulting her doctor, how-
ever, the student started teaching gymnastics classes. 45 While
demonstrating an exercise on the uneven parallel bars, she
tore tendons in her left leg and suffered a 15% to 20% perma-
nent loss of function in that leg.
4 6
At trial, the jury apportioned fault 50% to the student, 40%
to the bus company, and 10% to the school district. 47 Thus,
the trial court entered judgment denying any recovery for the
student and her father.48 The trial court did not allow counsel
to comment upon the effect of the jury's answers to a special
verdict form, and the student and her father appealed claiming
prejudicial error.49
The court of appeals first addressed whether the trial court
erred by forbidding counsel to comment upon the effect of the
jury's answers to the percentage of negligence question. The
court of appeals held that the trial court erred by forbidding
counsel to comment, citing the Minnesota Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.50 Thus, it was unnecessary to reach the more substan-
43. Id. Sharon Christopherson was 15 years old at the time of the accident. The
school principal had been aware students were walking between the buses, but took
no action to stop them. The bus company required parked buses to be placed in
neutral and the emergency brake set. Prior to the accident, the bus driver was violat-
ing both rules. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Christopherson was first injured on June 7, 1978. Id. Her gymnastics
accident occurred on July 14, 1983. Id. The treating physician had indicated the
original injuries would have healed themselves if proper care was taken. Id.
47. Id. at 847.
48. Id. Under Minnesota's comparative fault law a plaintiff's recovery is barred
whenever his fault exceeds that of the defendants against whom recovery is sought.
See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984).
49. Christopherson, 354 N.W.2d at 847. The trial court refused a special verdict
form which would have allocated any fault attributable to the student to either June
7, 1978 or July 14, 1983. Id.
50. Id. at 847-48. The court of appeals cited Rule 49.01(2) of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
In actions involving Minn. Stat. 1971, Sec. 604.01, the court shall inform the
jury of the effect of its answers to the percentage of negligence question and
shall permit counsel to comment thereon, unless the court is of the opinion
that doubtful or unresolved questions of law, or complex issues of law or
fact are involved, which may render such instruction or comment erroneous,
misleading or confusing to the jury.
MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01(2). The trial court did not disclose any belief in doubtful,
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tive, and more difficult, issue of whether the student's portion
of comparative fault should have been allocated to her sepa-
rate injuries: one on the day the student was trapped between
the buses and the other when she was dismounting from the
uneven parallel bars. In dictum, the court of appeals stated
that the student should recover something for her injuries sus-
tained when trapped between the two buses.
[W]hile an injured party's fault in not avoiding injury may
prevent recovery for that injury, it should not act to prevent
recovery for an earlier injury. While the law provides the
claimant with a remedy whether he seeks to avoid injurious
consequences or not, the amount of damages recoverable is
limited to the extent that he acted reasonably to prevent his
own loss.
51
The apportionment of fault between the two separate acci-
dents, however, appears to be inconsistent with the definition
of fault under Minnesota Statutes section 604.01.52 Christopher-
son indicates that a plaintiff should be able to recover for one
injury regardless of the plaintiff's subsequent exacerbation of
that injury.
While it remains uncertain whether a school district's liabil-
ity is limited or eliminated by a plaintiff's aggravation of an
original injury, the general standard of care is clear. A duty of
reasonable care is owed to both students and nonstudents.
School districts cannot rely on customary care. Reasonable
preventive measures are required.
B. School Board's Duty to Indemnify and Defend Teachers
Accused of Misconduct
In 1984, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Horace Mann
unresolved, or complex issues of law or fact. See Christopherson, 354 N.W.2d at 847.
The court of appeals concluded failure to permit counsel comment resulted in sub-
stantial prejudice to the student. Id. at 848.
51. Christopherson, 354 N.W.2d at 848.
52. Fault is defined in section 604.01, subdivision la of Minnesota Statutes as
follows:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, mis-
use of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the
basis for liability and to contributory fault.
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1984).
[Vol. 13
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Insurance Co. v. Independent School District No. 656.53 This case
addressed various insurers' liabilities and the duty to defend a
school teacher accused of sexually molesting a student. This
case also addressed the school district's duty to defend and the
consequent liability under these circumstances. Horace Mann
represents a comprehensive analysis of these issues but also
has some troubling implications.
In Horace Mann, the insurer of the teachers' union brought a
declaratory judgment action against the school district, its in-
surer, the teacher, the teacher's homeowner's insurer, the
abused student and the student's father for a determination of
its duty to defend or indemnify the teacher in the main action.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
union's insurer and the homeowner's insurer.5 4 The trial court
denied the school district's and the school district's insurer's
motions for partial summary judgment. 55 The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling regarding the
union's and the homeowner's insurers. 56 The court reversed
the trial court's refusal to grant partial summary judgment in
favor of the school district's insurer.57 The court also held the
school district had a duty to defend the teacher but not to in-
demnify the teacher in the main action. 58
The teacher in Horace Mann was employed by the school dis-
trict as an assistant coach of the girls' basketball team and as a
chemical dependency counselor. 59 During the school years
1978-79 and 1979-80, the teacher inflicted several sexual con-
tacts upon a student on the girls' basketball team who was also
receiving chemical dependency counseling from the teacher.60
The student suffered emotional problems, and the student and
her father sued the teacher.6' The suit included claims against
53. 355 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1984).
54. Id. at 413.
55. Id. at 414. The school district and its insurer had moved for partial summary
judgment on the basis they had no duty to defend the teacher in the main action. Id.
Subsequent motions to amend findings brought by the same parties were denied. Id.
A second summary judgment motion by the school district's insurer based on no duty
to defend or indemnify was denied. Id. at 414-15.
56. Id. at 421.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 415.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. During the relevant time, the student was in the tenth and eleventh
grades. Id. Her drug use was substantial including "speed," hashish, and alcohol.
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the school district as employer and for its own negligence in
hiring and retaining the teacher.62 The teacher requested de-
fense and indemnity from the various insurance companies
and the school district.63 Horace Mann then commenced the
declaratory judgment action. 64
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered the duties of the
insurers individually. It first considered whether Horace
Mann, the teachers' union insurer, was obligated to defend
and indemnify the teacher. The Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's holding that the teacher's conduct was
excluded under the intentional damages exclusion of the pol-
icy as a matter of law. 65 Although the teacher claimed he did
not intend to harm the student, the court held an intent to in-
jure or to damage the student could be inferred from the na-
ture of the acts as a matter of law.
66
The supreme court next analyzed the responsibilities of the
teacher's homeowner's insurance company. Again, the analy-
sis centered around the intentional injury exclusion contained
in the homeowner's policy. In this policy, however, the teacher
had purchased a business pursuits endorsement which pro-
tected the teacher from claims arising due to the teacher's in-
fliction of corporal punishment. 67 The supreme court held the
teacher was not covered by the homeowner's insurance policy
because the intentional injury exclusion still applied. 68 It
found the business pursuits endorsement applied only to "cor-
poral punishment inflicted while engaged in the business pur-
suit of teaching." 69
Id. While her chemical dependency caused emotional problems, those problems in-
creased after her contact with the teacher. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 415-16.
66. See id. at 416 (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834, 835
(Minn. 1982)). Intent to injure was inferred from the teacher's unconsented sexual
contact with a minor. Id.
67. Id. at 417.
68. Id. at 417-18. "Because there is no coverage under the main policy for inten-
tional injuries, there is no 'extended' coverage for an intentional injury under the
endorsement .... Id. at 418. The supreme court found the endorsement was un-
ambiguous and clearly limited. Id. The conflict between the intentional injury exclu-
sion and the endorsement is solved by applying the clear language of the corporal
punishment coverage endorsement. Id.
69. Id. at 418.
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The court then analyzed the school district insurer's liability
under the insurance policy. The Minnesota Supreme Court
found the trial court erred by refusing to grant partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of the school district's insurer. 70 The
school district's insurance policy also contained an intentional
injury exclusion. 7' The exclusion language under the school
district's policy in this case was identical to language analyzed
in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Hill. 72 Consequently, the
supreme court held the school district's insurer was entitled to
summary judgment on its duties to defend and indemnify the
teacher. 73
The court then considered the school district's duty to de-
fend and indemnify the teacher. The court held that, under
Minnesota Statutes, sections 127.03, subdivision 2 and 466.07,
subdivision la, the school district had an absolute duty to de-
fend the teacher.74 The court did, however, hold that despite
this duty to defend the teacher, the school district was not re-
quired to indemnify the teacher for the teacher's intentional
malfeasance. 75 The court cited 76 Minnesota Statutes section
466.07, subdivision la, which states, "The provisions of this
70. Id. at 419.
71. Id.
72. Id.; Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834. In Hill, an insurance company brought a declara-
tory judgment action to determine whether sexual activities engaged in by its insured
were covered under a homeowner's policy. Id. at 834. The insured was alleged to
have had sexual contact with one of his foster children. Id. at 835. The Hill court
stated:
Under the policy Fireman's agreed to pay, on behalf of the insured, all dam-
age for which the insured became liable because of bodily injury or property
damage caused by an occurence. An occurrence was defined as an accident
which results in bodily injury or property damage. The policy excluded
from coverage "bodily injury or property damage which is either expected
or intended from the standpoint of the insured."
Id. (emphasis added).
73. Horace Mann, 355 N.W.2d at 419.
74. Id. at 420. Section 127.03, subdivision 2 of Minnesota Statutes provides as
follows:
Upon written request of the teacher involved, any school district, however
organized, shall provide legal counsel for any school teacher against whom
claim is made or action is brought for recovery of damages in any tort action
involving physical injury to any person or property or for wrongful death
arising out of or in connection with the employment of such teacher with
such school district.
MINN. STAT. § 127.03, subd. 2 (1984).
75. Horace Mann, 355 N.W.2d at 420-21. The supreme court noted there was
confusion whether the indemnity issue was before them as a trial court ruling, but
deemed the issue submitted to them. Id. at 420 n.8.
76. Id. at 421.
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subdivision requiring indemnification do not apply in the case
of malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of duty."
77
The school district claimed it should then be excused from
liability under the municipal tort liability act78 because it did
not have insurance coverage after the court's ruling. 79 The
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this claim. First, the court
found the district's insurer would still be responsible for de-
fending and indemnifying the school district for the district's
own negligence in hiring and retaining the teacher.
80
Second, the court held that, by procuring insurance, the
school district waived its right to assert sovereign immunity.
The court stated:
[B]ecause the district attempted to obtain liability insurance
to cover the district and its employees, it has waived "the
defense of governmental immunity to the extent of the lia-
bility stated in the policy." Thus, the procurement of insur-
ance coverage waives the immunity defense up to the policy
limits even though the employee's tort may be subject to a
policy exclusion.
8'
This latter statement could have troubling implications for
school districts who find themselves in the precarious position
of being insured yet defending an action covered by a policy
exclusion. Under the supreme court's latest dictum, the school
77. Subdivision la in its entirety provides:
Each municipality or any instrumentality thereof shall indemnify and
provide defense for any employee or officer against judgments or any
amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred in connection
with any tort claim or demand arising out of an alleged act or omission oc-
curring within the scope of his employment or official duties, subject to the
limitations set forth in section 466.04.
The provisions of this subdivision requiring indemnification do not ap-
ply in the case of malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of duty.
MINN. STAT. § 466.07, subd. la (1984).
78. Id. §§ 466.01-.15 (1984). The municipal tort liability act regulates school dis-
trict liability, immunity, and insurance and provides caps for damages. Id.
79. Horace Mann, 355 N.W.2d at 420.
80. Id. The supreme court noted that the issue before it did not concern the
school district's own liability, but the school district's liability to indemnify against
the teacher's liability. Id. The Horace Mann court ultimately held the school district
did not have a duty to indemnify against the teacher's misconduct. The supreme
court stated, "When an adult teacher-counselor engaged in sexual contact with a 16-
year-old student, the exception of section 466.07, subd. la applies as a matter of
law." Id. at 421; see supra note 77 and accompanying text. The court therefore or-
dered summary judgment in favor of the school district regarding its duty to indem-
nify. Horace Mann, 355 N.W.2d at 421.
81. Horace Mann, 355 N.W.2d at 420-21 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 13
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/1
SCHOOL LA W
district will be liable up to the amount of the insurance cover-
age regardless of whether that insurance coverage applies in
that particular matter. Thus, a school district should be very
cautious in procuring insurance. A school district will not be
able to claim the defense of sovereign immunity even when the
insurance it has procured does not apply to a particular situa-
tion because of an exclusion in the policy.
C. School Board Immunity
One of the most interesting recent education cases is Freier v.
Independent School District No. 197.82 In Freier, a teacher who was
discharged for misconduct and insubordination brought an ac-
tion against the school district and school board members.
The teacher alleged three causes of action: (1) defamation;
(2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.8 3 The teacher's claims
were based upon the school board's decision to publish the
order dismissing the teacher.84
In the district court, the defendants moved for summary
judgment claiming they were protected by an absolute privi-
lege to publish their order.85 The trial court denied summary
judgment in favor of the school board members who voted
against publishing the order.86 The trial court held the other
school board members and the school board itself were not
covered by an absolute privilege to publish the order but certi-
fied the question to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 87
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the school board
and its members were protected by an absolute privilege in
publishing the teacher's termination order.88 The privilege
was based on: (1) an absolute judicial privilege because the
82. 356 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
83. Id. at 726-27.
84. Id. The teacher was dismissed in January 1981, but the school board's deci-
sion was reversed by the district court which was summarily affirmed by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in 1982. Id. The school board's decision and order contained
references to the events leading to the teacher's dismissal, including his touching and
spanking of his elementary school students. Id. at 727.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The trial court found the school board members voted in favor of publi-
cation. Consequently, the school board was protected only by a qualified privilege.
Id.
88. Id. at 733.
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board was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity;8 9 (2) an absolute
privilege to follow laws requiring the publication of the or-
der;90 and (3) an absolute privilege of the board to carry out its
discretionary functions. 9' The court stated, "If there is no ab-
solute immunity protecting school board members from liabil-
ity and defamation for their decision to discharge a teacher,
school board members will have a strong incentive to ignore
complaints about employees, in order to avoid any risk of ex-
posure to liability."92
The Freier court correctly applied absolute immunity in this
situation in order to ensure that school boards may adequately
perform their functions. By balancing the interests of the pub-
lic good against those of wrongfully terminated teachers, the
court of appeals determined the protection of school children
was paramount. The case, therefore, insulates school boards
from the extraneous and inhibiting fear of potential defama-
tion liability.
Recent developments in the areas of tort liability, standard
of care for school districts, school districts' duty to defend and
indemnify in tort actions, and school board immunity have not
89. In applying this principle, the Freier court's crucial finding was that the
school board's dismissal procedure constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The Freier court listed five characteristics which made a teacher termination
proceeding quasi-judicial in nature: (1) the board had the power to issue
subpoenas; (2) the board could administer oaths; (3) the board could order
the production of records and documents; (4) the board was required to
make charges against a teacher in writing and provide the teacher with an
opportunity to be heard; and (5) the board's decision was subject to judicial
review. Thus, the school board and its members could not be sued for their
actions and communications made in relation to Freier's termination.
Popovich & Niles, School Board Immunity From Libel Actions, 21 Educ. L. Rep. (West)
1099, 1100 (1985); see Freier, 356 N.W.2d at 729.
90. See MINN. STAT. §§ 13.43, subd. 2; 125.12, subd. 10 (1984) (requiring publi-
cation once the school board makes its decision); see also Freier, 356 N.W.2d at 729-30
(once school board voted to discharge teacher, it was required to publish its decision
by two different laws and, thus, school board members who made such decision were
protected by absolute privilege to follow requirements of law).
91. Freier, 356 N.W.2d at 728-31. The court of appeals held the trial court, in
finding a qualified privilege, erroneously relied upon federal civil rights case law. Id.
at 731.
The court of appeals applied Freier to the facts in Grossman v. School Board of
Indep. School Dist. No. 640, 389 N.W.2d 532 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). A teacher sued
the school district for defamation regarding publication of a letter alleging improper
conduct. The court found an absolute privilege did exist based upon the second and
third Freier grounds.
92. Freier, 356 N.W.2d at 732. The court of appeals elaborated that those suffer-
ing the greatest risk from this chilling effect would be the school children. Id. at 733.
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taken any drastic turns. The cases in this area over the last
four years represent a progressive development in application
of existing law to new fact situations.
II. COMPULSORY EDUCATION-HOME SCHOOLS AND TRUANCY
The status of compulsory education in Minnesota has under-
gone significant changes in the last year and a half. The statute
requiring compulsory education has been held unconstitu-
tional by the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the laws gov-
erning truancy have been significantly limited by the
Minnesota Court of Appeals.
A. Home Schools
State v. Newstrom,93 involved the criminal conviction of
Jeanne Newstrom for violation of the 1984 version of Minne-
sota Statutes section 120.12, subdivision 3. This statute was
Minnesota's compulsory school attendance law at the time of
Newstrom's conviction. Newstrom had removed both of her
young children from public school to teach them at home. The
Newstroms notified the local school superintendent of their ac-
tions, and the superintendent filed a complaint against Jeanne
Newstrom charging her with the misdemeanor of willful non-
compliance with section 120.12, subdivision 3.94 At trial, the
state argued Newstrom had not complied with subdivision 3,
the compulsory attendance law, because the Newstroms'
school did not meet the statutory definition of a school.95 The
relevant statute, Minnesota Statutes section 120.10, subdivi-
sion 2 then provided:
A school, to satisfy the requirements of compulsory attend-
ance, must be one: (1) in which all the common branches
are taught in the English language, from textbooks written
in the English language, and taught by teachers whose qual-
ifications are essentially equivalent to the minimum stan-
dards for public school teachers of the same grades or
subjects and (2) which is in session each school year for at
least 175 days or their equivalent .... 96
93. 371 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 1985).
94. Id. at 526.
95. Id. at 527.
96. MINN. STAT. § 120.10, subd. 2 (1984). The state argued that Newstrom
lacked the required formal education training. See Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 526.
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The central issue in Newstrom's trial concerned her qualifi-
cations as a teacher. 97 The state argued Newstrom's qualifica-
tions were not "essentially equivalent to the minimum
standards for public school teachers of the same grades or sub-
jects" because she had not received a baccalaureate degree and
had not completed a course of study approved by the Minne-
sota Board of Teaching. 98 These are the requirements a public
school teacher must meet for certification. 99
The trial court rejected Newstrom's proffered testimony
concerning her children's performance on standardized na-
tional tests. 100 It also refused to accept testimony from a
teacher and a doctor of education who would have testified
that Newstrom's qualifications were essentially equivalent to
the minimum standards for public school teachers.' 0 ' The trial
court "disallowed evidence bearing upon how she taught, test
results which indicated how well she taught, her life exper-
iences as relevant to her educational knowledge, her philoso-
phy of education, her reasons for teaching her children at
home, and the effectiveness of her children's home school-
ing."' 1 2 The trial court also rejected evidence and argument
of Newstrom's good faith and her attorney's attempt to argue
that her experience, knowledge and performance were rele-
vant to the issue of "essential equivalence."'10 3 Jeanne New-
strom was found guilty, and the trial court imposed a sentence
of 30 days in jail or payment of a $300 fine and a $30
surcharge. 10 4 Her conviction was affirmed by a three-judge
district court panel. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted
discretionary review. 10
5
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota Statutes
section 120.10, subdivision 2 was unconstitutional because the
term "essentially equivalent" was unconstitutionally vague.10 6
The court stated:
97. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 527.
98. See id. at 526.
99. See 5 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. §§ 3.041, 3.0501 (1982) (now published at
MINN. R. 8700.2700, 8700.2900 (1985)).
100. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 527.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 527, 533.
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Both principles underlying the requirement of definite-
ness-that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and that the statute does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement-are violated by the lan-
guage of the statute before us. "Essentially equivalent" is at
best an ambiguous term. It has no common law meaning
nor is it a term of art with an established meaning.10 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to give the statute a
limited construction to uphold its constitutionality.108 The
court went on to discuss the various interests at stake in fram-
ing a statute.' 0 9 The supreme court concluded the legislature
must redefine qualifications necessary to comply with the com-
pulsory attendance law." l0 The court stated:
We do not mean to suggest that under no circumstances
could parents' interest in directing their child's education
ever outweigh the state's interest in enforcing its compul-
sory attendance laws or other regulations, or that "home"
schooling is not an option that the legislature could or
should make more available to children and their parents
under certain conditions. .. . When the state imposes crimi-
nal penalties, however, citizens are constitutionally guaran-
teed that the offense be defined in the statute with sufficient
clarity to permit them to understand the nature of the con-
duct prohibited."'
The court reasoned that the problem of defining "essentially
equivalent" would be with the legislature and that it is the leg-
islature's task to implement compulsory education policies." 12
In response to Newstrom, the 1986 Minnesota Legislature re-
moved the language "taught by teachers whose qualifications
107. Id. at 528. The Newstrom court relied on Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352
(1983), in which the United States Supreme Court explained:
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. In writing the compulsory school attendance law, "the
legislature chose a term which implies a judgment without indicating who is to make
the judgment or what criteria are to be used except that the qualifications are to be
,essentially equivalent.' " Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 528. That vagueness rendered
the statute unconstitutional.
108. See Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d at 529.
109. See id. at 530-3 1.
110. Id. at 533.
111. Id. at 532.
112. Seeid. at 533.
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are essentially equivalent to the minimum standards for public
school teachers of the same grades or subjects."' 13 The legis-
lature also promulgated Minnesota Statutes section 120.10,
subdivisions 2a and 2b."14 These sections, effective only
through June 30, 1988,115 permit children to be instructed pri-
marily in the home provided the parent reports by October 1
of each year the name, address, and age of the child to the
superintendent of the district in which the child resides. Sub-
division 2b permits a parent to teach the child in the home
provided the instruction meets the remaining requirements of
subdivision 2.' 16 Subdivision 2b prevents any civil or criminal
proceedings against the parent complying with subdivision
2b. 117
The legislature also created a compulsory school attendance
task force to make recommendations about compulsory attend-
ance laws." t8 The task force is directed to address several is-
sues including "alternative ways to comply with the definition
of a school." t 9 The task force recommendations are due
before the legislature by February 1, 1987.120 Presumably, af-
ter the compulsory school attendance task force makes its rec-
ommendations, the legislature will pass further legislation in
an attempt to clarify what requirements must be met to teach a
child in the home.
Newstrom has greatly expanded the possibilities for home ed-
113. See Act of April 1, 1986, ch. 472, § 1, 1986 Minn. Laws 1078, 1079.
114. Subd. 2a. [REPORTS ABOUT INSTRUCTION IN A HOME.] If a par-
ent of a child required to attend school, according to subdivision 1, is pro-
viding for instruction of the child primarily in a home, the parent shall
report by October 1 each year the name, address, and age of the child to the
superintendent of the district in which the child resides. The parent shall
not be required to report other information to the superintendent.
Id. § 2, 1986 Minn. Laws at 1079.
Subd. 2b. [PROTECTION FOR INSTRUCTION IN A HOME.] A par-
ent of a child required to attend school, according to subdivision 1, may
provide for instruction of the child in a home if the instruction meets the
requirements of subdivision 2. Civil or criminal proceedings shall not be
commenced under section 120.10, 120.12, 127.20, chapter 260, or similar
law against a parent complying with this subdivision as a result of providing
for instruction in a home.
Id. § 3, 1986 Minn. Laws at 1079.
115. See id. § 5, 1986 Minn. Laws at 1080.
116. For the text of subdivision 2b, see supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. See Act of April 1, 1986, ch. 472, § 4, 1986 Minn. Laws at 1079.
119. See id.
120. See id.
[Vol. 13
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/1
SCHOOL LA W
ucation. While those taught at home generally still must be
instructed in the English language and from English language
textbooks for at least 175 days of the year, specific qualifica-
tions for teachers have not been established. A return of re-
quired qualifications may be seen after recommendations are
made by the newly created task force. Practitioners should be
alert for further legislation.
B. Truancy
In In re L.Z.,121 the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed
several cases involving habitual a truancy under Minnesota
Statutes section 120.10.122 L.Z. involved the adjudication of
three juveniles for delinquency. The court held that in order
to establish truancy, the truancy had to "be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 2 3 Proof of truancy consisted of two ele-
ments: "First, the fault in 'absenting himself' must be
shown.... Second, the absences must be 'without lawful ex-
cuse.' "124 The court of appeals held the evidence in each of
the cases was insufficient to support an adjudication of tru-
ancy. 125 The court of appeals rejected admission of school at-
tendance records because the records violated the juveniles'
right of confrontation and cross-examination. 26
The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently held school at-
tendance records are admissible to establish school absences if
a proper foundation is laid. 127 The records can be used to
show the child's absence on a particular day, whether a paren-
tal excuse was offered, and the substance of that excuse. 128 If
the school rejected a facially valid excuse, the school attend-
ance records will be inadmissible.129
121. 380 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. C7-
85-1357 (Minn. Nov. 21, 1986).
122. MINN. STAT. § 120.10, subd. 3 (1984); see id. § 260.015, subd. 19 (definition
of habitual truancy).
123. See L.Z., 380 N.W.2d at 902.
124. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260.015, subd. 19).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 904-06.
127. L.Z, No. C7-85-1357, slip op. at 8-9 (Minn. Nov. 21, 1986) (must show
records were "prepared in accordance with clear, adequate, and reliable policies and
procedures consistent with the law defining habitual truancy").
128. Id. at 9-10.
129. Id. at 10. The school's evaluation of the truthfulness of the excuse erodes the
reliability necessary for admission of hearsay evidence. The records become inad-
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Despite admissibility of the records to demonstrate unlawful
excuse, the state must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the child's absence was volitional by introducing testi-
mony regarding the child's excuse for the absence.1 30 To
avoid an inference of volitional conduct, the student may pres-
ent contrary evidence. 31 If the contrary evidence is sufficient,
the student cannot be adjudged a habitual truant.13
2
The adoption of a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in
truancy cases may restrict the state's ability to enforce truancy
laws. The state must now show something more than habitual
absence. It must affirmatively demonstrate fault and lack of ex-
cuse. Overall, recent cases dealing with truancy and compul-
sory education appear to have significantly reduced the
enforceability statutes imposing compulsory public education.
III. OPEN MEETING LAWS AND SCHOOL CLOSINGS
Four interesting cases have arisen in the areas of open meet-
ing laws and school closings in recent years.
A. Open Meeting Laws
In St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools, t 33
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that gatherings of all mem-
bers of the school board and district administrators for the
purpose of providing board members with information con-
cerning current educational issues were meetings under the
Minnesota Open Meeting Law.' 34 In September 1980 and Au-
gust 1981, school board members held meetings for which no
public notice was given.13 5 Appellants, St. Cloud Newspapers,
brought an action in district court seeking to have the court
missible and the student must be permitted to confront the person making the ad-
verse judgment. Id. at 7, 10.
130. See id. at 11. A student will not be adjudged a truant if merely obeying a
parent's wrongful command to remain at home. Id. at 5.
131. Id. at 12.
132. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's determination of habitual tru-
ancy regarding two of the students. The truancy determination of the third student
was reversed because the state failed to demonstrate the student's volitional conduct.
The third student had moved to live with his mother in a different school attendance
district. The mother had failed to enroll the child in the new school or arrange for
his continued attendance at his old school. See id. at 12-14.
133. 332 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1983).
134. See id. at 7.
135. See id. at 2-3.
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declare that the school district superintendent and school
board members had violated the state's open meeting law.'
3 6
The trial court determined that none of the occasions consti-
tuted meetings as defined by the Minnesota Open Meeting
Law. 137
The meetings in question were conducted as seminars in
136. See id.
137. Id. at 2. The Minnesota Open Meeting Law states in pertinent part:
Subdivision 1. Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all
meetings, including executive sessions, of any state agency, board, commis-
sion or department when required or permitted by law to transact public
business in a meeting, and the governing body of any school district how-
ever organized, unorganized territory, county, city, town, or other public
body, and of any committee, subcommittee, board, department or commis-
sion thereof, shall be open to the public, except meetings of the board of
pardons and the commissioner of corrections. The votes of the members of
such state agency, board, commission or department or of such governing
body, committee, subcommittee, board, department or commission on any
action taken in a meeting herein required to be open to the public shall be
recorded in a journal kept for that purpose, which journal shall be open to
the public during all normal business hours where such records are kept.
The vote of each member shall be recorded on each appropriation of
money, except for payments ofjudgments, claims and amounts fixed by stat-
ute. This secton shall not apply to any state agency, board, or commission
when exercising quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings.
Subd. la. Subdivision 1 does not apply to a meeting held pursuant to
the procedure in this subdivision. The governing body of a public employer
may by a majority vote in a public meeting decide to hold a closed meeting
to consider strategy for labor negotiations, including negotiation strategies
or developments or discussion and review of labor negotiation proposals,
conducted pursuant to sections 179A.01 to 179A.25. The time of com-
mencement and place of the closed meeting shall be announced at the pub-
lic meeting. A written roll of members and all other persons present at the
closed meeting shall be made available to the public after the closed meet-
ing. The proceedings of a closed meeting to discuss negotiation strategies
shall be tape recorded at the expense of the governing body and shall be
preserved by it for two years after the contract is signed and shall be made
available to the public after all labor contracts are signed by the governing
body for the current budget period.
If an action is brought claiming that public business other than discus-
sion of labor negotiation strategies or developments or discussion and re-
view of labor negotiation proposals was transacted at a closed meeting held
pursuant to this subdivision during the time when the tape is not available to
the public the court shall review the recording of the meeting in camera. If
the court determines that no violation of this section is found, the action
shall be dismissed and the recording shall be preserved in the records of the
court until otherwise made available to the public pursuant to this secton. If
the court determines that a violation of this section is found, the recording
may be introduced at trial in its entirety subject to any protective orders as
requested by either party and deemed appropriate by the court.
The prevailing party in an action brought before or after the tape is
made available to the public which establishes that a violation of this section
has occurred shall recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees as deter-
mined by the court.
Subd. lb. In any meeting which under subdivision 1 must be open to
the public, at least one copy of any printed materials relating to the agenda
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nearby motels. 38 Generally, one person would present a pa-
per and then there would be discussion of the topic. 139 Topics
included long range planning, enrollment decline, goals of the
board of education and other miscellaneous topics. 40 The
meetings were attended by school board members, district ad-
ministrators, secondary school principals and the superinten-
dent of schools. 41 The Minnesota Supreme Court was faced
with three issues: (1) whether the seminars constituted meet-
ings under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law; (2) whether the
Minnesota Open Meeting Law was unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad; and (3) whether the superintendent of schools was
subject to the penalties of the Minnesota Open Meeting
Law. 14
2
School officials claimed the seminars were not meetings
under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law because there were
no deliberations on pending matters, no decisions were made,
and there was no attempt to reach a consensus on any of the
matters being discussed.14 3 The trial court adopted this inter-
pretation, holding that the statute did "not include 'seminars'
at which factual information [was] presented."' 144 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the seminars did
constitute meetings under the Minnesota Open Meeting
items of the meeting which are prepared or distributed by or at the direction
of the governing body or its employees and which are:
(1) distributed at the meeting to all members of the governing body;
(2) distributed before the meeting to all members; or
(3) available in the meeting room to all members;
shall be available in the meeting room for inspection by the public. The
materials shall be available to the public while the governing body considers
their subject matter. This subdivision does not apply to materials classified
by law as other than public as defined in chapter 13, or to materials relating
to the agenda items of a closed meeting held in accordance with the proce-
dures in subdivision I a or other law permitting the closing of meetings. If a
member intentionally violates the requirements of this subdivision, that
member shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $100.
An action to enforce this penalty may be brought by any person in any court
of competent jurisdiction where the administrative office of the member is
located.
MINN. STAT. § 471.705 (1984). The remaining subdivisions provide sanctions for
failure to comply (subd. 2) and the act's title (subd. 3).
138. St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 2-3.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 4.
144. Id.
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Law. 145
The supreme court first discussed the purpose of the Minne-
sota Open Meeting Law. 146 The court concluded that the pur-
pose of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law was (1) to prevent
public bodies from taking secret actions, (2) to guarantee the
public's right to be informed, and (3) to ensure the public
would have an opportunity to present its views.' 47 In effectuat-
ing these purposes, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that
''open meeting statutes are enacted for the public benefit and
are to be construed most favorably to the public."' 48 The
court discussed how other states have dealt with the open
meeting question."49 Minnesota, it said, has adopted an open
meeting law whereby "everything not specifically closed is
open."' 50 After comparing this position with other states' po-
sitions that every meeting not specifically open is closed, the
court concluded openness in government was a superior policy
and that limits to openness should be carefully and narrowly
defined. 151
The court went on to recognize a narrow exception to the
145. Id. at 8. Justice Simonett concurred in part and dissented in part and was
joined by Justice Kelley. Justice Simonett noted that "[tihe decisionmaking process
advances along a continuum." Id. at 8 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). He dissented regarding one of the involved seminars concluding it did
not violate the open meeting law because "[t]he school board was not meeting as a
board to transact public business." Id. at 9. He stated:
In my view, if board members meet with administrators or others for
background information and general study, and specific district problems
are mentioned, if at all, only in an illustrative sense, this kind of gathering is
not a meeting as contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 471.705 (1982). The semi-
nar-type discussion that takes place at such a meeting is not the kind that
ordinarily and apppropriately occurs at an open public meeting. Nor is it
the type of discussion that impairs the public's right of input in the decision
making process, since it occurs at such a remote stage of that process.
Neither is it the type of discussion that impairs the public's right "to become
fully informed concerning board decisions," nor is it the kind of discussion
that lends itself to "improper influences."
Id. (citations omitted).
146. See id. at 4-5.
147. Id. at 4. The supreme court noted that "[n]either the legislature nor this
court has defined the term 'meeting' as used in Minn. Stat. § 471.705." Id.
148. Id. See generally Note, The Minnesota Open Meeting Law After Twenty Years-A
Second Look, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 375 (1979) (analyzing the Minnesota statute in
relation to those of other states).
149. St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 5 (state legislatures must choose to either
close everything not specifically open, or open everything not specifically closed).
150. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1.
151. St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 5 (quoting Little & Tompkins, Open Gov-
ernment Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REV. 451, 475 (1974)).
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open meeting law for attorney-client meetings.15 2 The court
specifically limited this exception stating, "The Minnesota leg-
islature clearly intended that all meetings of public agencies be
open, with rare and carefully restrained exception."1 53 With
the background of the Minnesota Open Meeting Law
presented, the court addressed whether these particular semi-
nars constituted meetings under the open meeting law. 154 The
court stated, "The statute will be liberally construed in order
to protect the public's right to full access to the decision-mak-
ing process of public bodies governed by section 471.705.
This includes meetings at which information is received which
may influence later decisions of such bodies."'' 55 The court
concluded the seminars in St. Cloud Newspapers were meetings
under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law.'
56
The court limited this holding stating, "the Minnesota Open
Meeting Law does not apply to chance or social gatherings."'
57
The court also noted that in a recent case, Hubbard Broadcasting,
152. Id. at 5. That exception was created by the supreme court in Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. The Housing and Redevelopment Auth. in and for the City of
Minneapolis, 310 Minn. 313, 251 N.W.2d 620 (1976). There, the newspaper sought
access to a meeting between the housing agency and its attorney. The meeting was
for the purpose of discussing litigation strategy regarding a case in which the agency
and one of it members were defendants. Id. at 314-15, 251 N.W.2d at 621. The
supreme court concluded that the open meeting law and the attorney-client privilege
were compatible and concurrent and that the meeting should be closed. Id. at 322,
251 N.W.2d at 625. But the supreme court cautioned:
We cannot emphasize too strongly that should this exception be applied as a
barrier against public access to public affairs, it will not be tolerated, for this
court has consistently emphasized that respect for and adherence to the
First Amendment is absolutely essential to the continuation of our demo-
cratic form of government. It will be upheld, however, if the balancing of
the conflicting public policies dictates the need for absolute confidentiality.
The exception is therefore available to satisfy the concerns expressed herein
but is to be employed or invoked cautiously and seldom in situations other
than in relation to threatened or pending litigation.
Id. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626.
153. St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 5 (emphasis in original). The dissent
states that "to allow exceptions to the open meeting law raises the fear that the ex-
ceptions will be abused." Id. at 8 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
154. Id. at 6.
155. Id.
156. Id. The court stated the discussions at those seminars concerned topics
"which could foreseeably require final action by the board." Id.
157. Id. at 7. The court also explained that the open meeting law does not pro-
hibit meetings of public bodies, but merely requires that affected gatherings must be
open to the public. See id.
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Inc. v. City of Afton,158 the court had held that a meeting be-
tween two city council members was not a violation of the Min-
nesota Open Meeting Law.'
59
The court next held that the open meeting law did not vio-
late the rights of free speech or free assembly under the first
amendment of the United States Constitution because the
state's compelling interest in prohibiting secret government
action outweighed any minimal intrusion on the first amend-
ment rights of public officials.1 60 The court noted, however,
that the Minnesota Open Meeting Law did not apply to the
superintendent of schools because he was an ex officio member
of the school board.1
6'
St. Cloud Newspapers helped resolve some questions sur-
rounding what types of meetings constitute a meeting under
the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. It did not, however, define
when a gathering would be considered a meeting or how many
members of an organization are needed to constitute a meet-
ing under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law.
Those questions were addressed in Moberg v. Independent
School District No. 281.162 Moberg involved a declaratory judg-
ment action brought by taxpayers.1 63 The taxpayers requested
(1) that the school district be enjoined from closing a school
and (2) a declaratory judgment that board members had acted
in violation of the open meeting laws.164 The school district in
Moberg found it necessary to close one of three high schools,
but the board could not reach a consensus on which school to
close. 165 After a deadlock among the school board members
and several hearings on the issue, the school board appointed
158. 323 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1982). In Hubbard, two city council members dis-
cussed an application for a special use permit regarding construction of a satellite
station during lunch. The supreme court held that discussion did not violate the
open meeting law. Id. at 765.
159. Id.; see St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 6 n.2.
160. See St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 7. "These rights protect expression of
ideas, not the right to conduct public business in closed meetings." Id.
161. See id. at 8; see also Minnesota Educ. Ass'n v. Bennett, 321 N.W.2d 395, 397-
98 (Minn. 1983) (holding "a school superintendent is not a member of the school
board for purposes of the Open Meeting Law").
162. 336 N.W.2d 510 (Minn. 1983). For an excellent review of Moberg, St. Cloud
Newspapers, and the Open Meeting Law, see generally Note, What Constitutes a "Meet-
ing" Under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law?, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 251 (1985).
163. Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 512.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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a neutral factfinding body to recommend which school to
close. !66
While the factfinding commission was conducting its investi-
gation, each of the board members contacted other board
members to persuade them to vote in a certain way. 167 The
trial court found that board members gathered in private on at
least seventeen occasions to discuss the school closing issue.168
The trial court also determined that the board violated the
open meeting law by conducting numerous telephone conver-
sations with other board members about the school closing. 69
The trial court concluded there were fourteen separate viola-
tions of the open meeting law.17 0
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with
two issues: (1) did the board members violate the hearing and
notice provisions of the school closing law; and (2) did the trial
court properly define meetings under the open meeting law as
two or more members engaging in deliberations on board
business?
1 7 '
The Moberg appellants claimed the school district violated
the school closing law because the appellants did not have an
opportunity to comment upon the factfinding panel's recom-
mendation before the school board made its final decision.' 72
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this argument holding
that the notice and hearing provision of the school closing law
"does not require an opportunity for rebuttal of all evidence or
testimony."'' 7 3 The court found that the board complied with
the statutory requirements by publishing the notice and receiv-
166. Id. at 513. The three schools were Robbinsdale Senior High School, Cooper
Senior High School, and Armstrong Senior High School. Each school possessed va-
ried favorable qualities making selection of which school to close difficult. After a
deadlock was reached, the school board unanimously passed a motion proposing to
close all three schools. The school board never seriously intended to close all three.
At that same meeting, the factfinding panel was created. See id.
167. See id. at 514.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 514. A $100 fine was imposed against each school board member pur-
suant to the statute. See id. (citing to Minn. Stat. § 471.705, subd. 2).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 514-15.
173. Id. at 515. The school board voted to reopen Cooper and Armstrong High
Schools based on the recommendations of the factfinding panel. At that meeting no
public comment was allowed. Id. at 514.
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ing extensive public testimony at earlier stages.' 74
The court then considered whether the trial court's defini-
tion of meetings as two or more members intentionally engag-
ing in deliberations on school business was correct.17 5 The
court stated:
The Open Meeting Law, Minn. Stat. § 471.705 (1982), does
not define the "meetings" to which its terms apply, and is
therefore indefinite with respect to (1) the number of offi-
cials that constitute a meeting and (2) the kinds of activities
that fall within the purview of the law.'
76
The court found Moberg a ripe opportunity to deliver a com-
prehensive definition of "meeting" for purposes of the open
meeting law.' 77 The court first noted it had decided cases
dealing with different extremes of the same issue under the
open meeting law. The court noted the St. Cloud Newspapers
holding that scheduled informational meetings were consid-
ered meetings under the open meeting law and its decision in
Hubbard Broadcasting that "a discussion between two members
of a governing body about a matter pending before that body
is not a per se violation of the statute." 178 Thus, the Moberg
court was forced to determine what proportion of public body
greater than two members but less than the whole fell under
174. Id. at 515. The schoolhouse closing statute provides:
The board may close a schoolhouse only after a public hearing on the ques-
tion of the necessity and practicability of the proposed closing. Published
notice of the hearing shall be given for two weeks in the official newspaper
of the district. The time and place of the meeting, the description and loca-
tion of the schoolhouse, and a statement of the reasons for the closing shall
be specified in the notice. Parties requesting to give testimony for and
against the proposal shall be heard by the board before it makes a final deci-
sion to close or not to close the schoolhouse.
MINN. STAT. § 123.36, subd. 11 (1984).
The Moberg court concluded:
[I]nformation received after a public hearing may be considered, provided it
is obtained in accord with the Open Meeting Law and the decision is based
upon the reasons stated in the public notice and issues addressed in public
hearings.... The fact-gathering and deliberation process may continue un-
til the Board feels confident that it is adequately prepared to decide the mat-
ter. In this case, the Board, which has wide discretion in such matters, chose
to weigh the panel's recommendations heavily in making its decision. It was
also capable of discounting any possible errors contained in the panel's re-
port without submitting it to another round of public debate.
Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 515.
175. Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 516.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see St. Cloud Newspapers, 332 N.W.2d at 7; Hubbard Broadcasting, 323
N.W.2d at 765.
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the auspices of the open meeting law. 179
A majority of jurisdictions restrict their open meeting laws'
application to a majority or quorum of a public body.180 Since
the Minnesota statute refers to a "governing body,"'' the
court found that a quorum requirement was implicit in the
Minnesota statute.' 82 The court believed that a quorum re-
quirement served the legislative intent of balancing the legisla-
tive policy of making public bodies' decisions open while, at
the same time, ensuring that public bodies are free to conduct
their business.' 83 The court stated:
"Meetings" . . . are those gatherings of a quorum or more
members of the governing body, or a quorum of a commit-
tee, subcommittee, board department, or a commission
thereof, at which members discuss, decide, or receive infor-
mation as a group on issues relating to the official business
of that governing body. Although "chance or social gather-
ings" are exempt from the requirements of the statute, the
quorum may not, as a group, discuss or receive information
on official business in any setting under the guise of a pri-
vate social gathering. The statute does not apply to letters
or telephone conversations between fewer than a
quorum.1 8
4
The court noted appellants' concern about the different pos-
sibilities for circumventing this definition of a meeting under
the open meeting law.185 The court stated, "There is a way to
illegally circumvent any rule the court might fashion, and
therefore it is important that the rule not be so restrictive as to
lose the public benefit of personal discussion between public
officials while gaining little assurance of openness."' 86 The
179. See generally Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 517 (while the statute clearly requires no-
tice and an open meeting of the whole, it is not immediately clear whether the law
applies to an informal discussion between a few members).
180. Id. (citing Note, supra note 148, at 390 n.70 & 72-73).
181. See MINN. STAT. § 471.705, subd. 1.
182. Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 517. A quorum of a school board is a majority of its
voting members. MINN. STAT. § 123.33, subd. 5. Less than a majority of the voting
members cannot govern.
183. Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 517. In Moberg, "great time pressure" required the
board to reach a swift decision. The discussions between board members were ef-
forts to break the time consuming deadlock. No covert purpose was intended. The
conversations were efforts only to mobilize the decisionmaking process. Id.
184. Id. at 518 (citation omitted).
185. See id.
186. Id. The court continued, stating, "Of course, serial meetings in groups of
less than a quorum for the purpose of avoiding public hearings or fashioning agree-
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court further commented that it would continue to scrutinize
all types of meetings depending upon the individual circum-
stances of each particular matter. 8 7 The court then concluded
there were no violations of the open meeting law in Moberg.'8 8
Moberg represents a practical and comprehensive definition
of meeting under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. School
boards and other public bodies now have sufficient guidance as
to which types of gatherings will be considered meetings. A
public body attempting to comply with the provisions of the
open meeting law should have little difficulty under the Moberg
definition. At the same time, however, the Minnesota Supreme
Court did not preclude review of possible attempts to circum-
vent the open meeting law.
B. School Closings
With the tapering of population growth, many school dis-
tricts have been faced with declining enrollment and the neces-
sity of school closings. Schools may be closed "only after a
public hearing on the question of the necessity and practicabil-
ity of the proposed closing."' 8 9 Notice of the hearing is re-
quired, and parties wanting to speak must be heard by the
school board.190 A school board's decision on this subject is
given great deference on review provided the decision is sup-
ported by substantial evidence.' 91
In 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed two cases
involving school closings. In Bena Parent Association v. Independ-
ent School District No. 115,192 the school district was operating
ment on an issue may also be found to be a violation of the statute depending upon
the facts of the individual case." Id.
In Grossman v. School Board of Indep. School Dist. No. 640, 389 N.W.2d 532
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) such a fact situation arose. Three board members met at one
location, three met at another and one did not meet. The members at different loca-
tions communicated by telephone. The issue of whether this situation violated the
open meeting law was not reached because the claim was dismissed without prejudice
on procedural grounds. Id. at 536.
187. Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 518.
188. Id.
189. MINN. STAT. § 123.36, subd. 11; see Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 515.
190. See MINN. STAT. § 123.36, subd. 11. Notice must be published for two weeks
in the district's official newspaper and must indicate the meeting's time and place,
describe the school and its location and specify the reasons for closing. Testimony is
required to be heard before a final decision is made. See id.
191. See Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 515-16.
192. 381 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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elementary schools within nineteen miles of each other in Bena
and Cass Lake.' 9 3 Enrollment decline and financial limitations
forced consideration of closing Bena Elementary.194 After a
hearing, the school board decided to close the school.
95
The Bena Parent Association challenged the decision be-
cause of alleged procedural errors at the hearing. 196 The asso-
ciation claimed the school board should have employed an
independent hearing officer. 197 The court of appeals rejected
this argument because a school board is given broad discretion
in school closing decisions, and its decision need not be based
solely on hearing testimony.1 98 Although stating "an in-
dependent hearing officer would provide additional benefits
and safeguards in school closing hearings,"' 99 the court con-
cluded it was unnecessary to impose a due process
requirement.200
The court of appeals also rejected the parent association's
argument that the school superintendent was required to tes-
tify under oath and answer all questions posed because the re-
quirements are not found in the school closing statute. An
interested party's only statutory right is the opportunity to be
heard. 20 '
The parent association also appealed the school board's sub-
stantive basis for decision. The parents requested the decision
be set aside because no specific finding was made that the clos-
193. See id. at 518.
194. See id. at 518-19.
195. See id. Bena residents protested, emphasizing the quality of education pro-
vided at Bena Elementary and criticizing the long bus ride to Cass Lake. Id. at 519.
196. See id. at 520.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 520-21 (quoting Moberg, 336 N.W.2d at 515 and citing Western Area
Business and Civic Club v. Duluth School Board Indep. School Dist. No. 709, 324
N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. 1982)).
199. Id. at 520.
200. Id. The court of appeals emphasized the distinction between school closings
and teacher terminations where the school board acts in a quasi-judicial role. It con-
cluded "there is not the same opportunity for arbitrary action against an individual"
in school closings as is found in teacher termination cases. Id. at 521.
201. Id. at 520. Compare MINN. STAT. § 123.36, subd. 11 (testimony shall be heard
in school closing) with MINN. STAT. § 127.31, subd. 8 (1984) (testimony must be
under oath in pupil expulsion).
The court of appeals also concluded an administrator at a school closing hearing
need not answer all questions. Interested persons must only be heard, not re-
sponded to. Bena, 381 N.W.2d at 520.
[Vol. 13
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss1/1
SCHOOL L4 W
ing was necessary and practical. 20 2 The court of appeals held
that the findings supported the board's decision and that the
findings need not use the exact statutory language.203
Kelly v. Independent School District No. 623,204 involved an ap-
peal from a school board's decision to close Kellogg High
School in Little Canada in the Roseville School District.
Before the final decision, a public hearing was held. On ap-
peal, appellants complained the school board made its deci-
sion to close at a school board meeting prior to the public
hearing at which a comprehensive plan calling for the school's
closing was approved. 20 5
The court of appeals analyzed Minnesota Statutes section
123.36, subdivision 11,206 and concluded that the statute did
not specify the decisionmaking stage at which a public hearing
must be held. The court determined the proposed closing
under the comprehensive plan was not a final decision and that
the statutory requirements were met by the public hearing held
before the final decision.
20 7
The Kelly appellants also challenged the sufficiency of the ev-
idence. Appellants argued the reports and studies involved
demonstrated a need to close a high school within the dis-
trict,20 8 but that the evidence did not demonstrate the propri-
ety of closing Kellogg instead of Ramsey High School. 20 9 The
court of appeals agreed, stating that no reflective findings were
made to support the school board's choice of schools. The
long-term welfare of the district should be considered and the
basis for the choice must be expressed. 210
202. Bena, 381 N.W.2d at 520.
203. Id. at 519-20. "Although [Minn. Stat. § 123.36, subd. 11] implicitly requires
a determination of necessity and practicability, there is no absolute requirement that
those words be used." Id. at 519.
The court of appeals also held sufficient evidence supported the school board's
decision. Id. at 520.
204. 380 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
205. Id. at 835. Between adopting the comprehensive plan and holding the public
hearing, the school board established a task force to assess grade reorganization.
The board also reviewed letters from city officials, parent-teacher organizations and
other residents. Id. at 834.
206. See supra note 174 (text of MINN. STAT. § 123.36, subd. 11).
207. See Kelly, 380 N.W.2d at 836. The school board could have reversed its deci-
sion to close the school if closure later was shown as not necessary or practicable. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. The school board claimed its decision was based in part on value judg-
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These recent developments emphasize the great discretion
allowed school boards in closing schools. While adequate
findings are required, due process requirements do not se-
verely restrict school boards' discretion.
IV. HIRING AND FIRING ISSUES
A. Due Process and Other Procedural Considerations
In recent years, the Minnesota courts have decided numer-
ous cases addressing the procedural aspects of terminating or
placing teachers on unrequested leaves of absence. Cases have
dealt with issues such as the required notice of termination or
proposed placement on unrequested leave of absence, the par-
ties entitled to a hearing, and the type of hearing that must be
afforded.
In Finley v. Independent School District No. 566,211 the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals reversed a school board's placement of a
teacher on unrequested leave of absence because the school
board had not provided a separate proposal to terminate the
teacher. The court began, stating, "A continuing contract em-
ployee has a protected property interest which can only be ter-
minated under the procedural requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 125.12 (1982)."212
The Finley school board terminated the teacher's position
and later served notice on the teacher of proposed placement
on unrequested leave of absence. The court held the school
board had not followed the applicable procedure contained in
Minnesota Statutes section 125.12213 and stated, "The proce-
ments and "soft data," but the record failed to articulate those judgments or that
data. Id. The court of appeals stated, "We realize that there may be subjective con-
cerns and pressures that influence such a controversial decision, but unless they are
part of the record we cannot consider them as support for the School Board's deci-
sion." Id. at 837.
211. 359 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). In Finley, the teacher had a continu-
ing contract as an elementary principal. The school district voted to eliminate the
separate position of elementary principal and establish a half-time principal position
which would be assumed by the more senior district superintendent who was also
licensed as an elementary principal. Id. at 750.
212. Id. at 751.
213. Minnesota Statutes section 125.12 provides:
Before a teacher's contract is terminated by the board, the board shall notify
the teacher in writing and state its ground for the proposed termination in
reasonable detail together with a statement that the teacher may make a
written request for a hearing before the board within 14 days after receipt of
such notification. Within 14 days after receipt of this notification the
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dures set out in Minn. Stat. § 125.12 necessarily involves two
separate decisions by a school board: (1) a decision to propose
termination or demotion, and (2) a decision, after a hearing if
requested, to terminate or demote." 2 14 The court's decision in
Finley was also based on the court's belief that the school board
had improperly delegated its responsibility to propose place-
ment of teachers on unrequested leave of absence to the su-
perintendent of schools. 21 5
The type of notice which will satisfy the statutory require-
ment was discussed in Forbes v. Independent School District No.
196216 and Schmidt v. Independent School District No. 1. 2 17 In
Forbes, a substitute teacher was terminated for abandoning his
teaching position for two days. 218 The teacher contended the
school district's three-day notice was inadequate and did not
afford the teacher time to prepare for a hearing. 219 The court
of appeals held the three-day notice was sufficient under the
teacher may make a written request for a hearing before the board and it
shall be granted upon reasonable notice to the teacher of the date set for
hearing, before final action is taken. If no hearing is requested within such
period, it shall be deemed acquiescence by the teacher to the board's action.
Such termination shall take effect at the close of the school year in which the
contract is terminated in the manner aforesaid. Such contract may be termi-
nated at any time by mutual consent of the board and the teacher and this
section shall not affect the powers of a board to suspend, discharge, or de-
mote a teacher under and pursuant to other provisions of law.
MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 4 (1984).
214. Finley, 359 N.W.2d at 751 (emphasis added). The requirement of adequate
notice under section 125.12 was previously adhered to by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. See Fisher v. Independent School Dist. No. 622, 357 N.W.2d 152, 155
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Ostlund v. Independent School Dist. No. 47, 354 N.W.2d
492, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
215. Finley, 359 N.W.2d 751-52. The court of appeals stated the authority to ter-
minate a continuing contract teacher is not a ministerial duty which the school board
may delegate. Id. at 751.
216. 358 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), petition for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13,
1985). The teacher had five conferences with school district administrators regard-
ing his poor teaching performance. After the last conference, the teacher left his
teaching post for two days without giving notice. The school district gave the teacher
three days notice of its intended action. See id. at 151-52.
217. 349 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The teacher received notice of pro-
posed placement on unrequested leave of absence which stated, "[tihat the grounds
of said notice are within the grounds for unrequested leave placement as set forth in
M.S. 125.12, Subdivision 6b, and are hereby adopted as fully as though separately set
forth and resolved herein." Id. at 564. He later received a notice of proposed termi-
nation which stated the grounds in essentially the same language. Id. at 565. The
teacher was subsequently terminated. Id.
218. Forbes, 358 N.W.2d at 151.
219. Id. at 152.
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circumstances. 220 The court also held that unexcused absence
from a substitute teaching position was not a factual issue re-
quiring a formal hearing.
22'
In Schmidt, a teacher contested the adequacy of the school
board's written notice of proposed termination. The notice
provided by the school board contained reference to the stat-
ute governing unrequested leave of absence, but did not state
the specific grounds the school board was relying on in placing
the teacher on unrequested leave of absence. 222 Citing several
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions, 223 the court of appeals
held that the school board's incorporation and reference to the
applicable statute was adequate notice.
224
After a school board has provided a teacher with proper no-
tice of proposed placement on unrequested leave of absence,
the teacher may request a hearing.225 The teacher's request
must be made within fourteen days after receipt of notice.
226
Notice must be delivered to the school board. 227 If a request is
not made within that period, the teacher is deemed to have
acquiesced in the school board's action.
228
In Roseville Education Association v. Independent School District
No. 623,229 the court of appeals analyzed the requirement of a
request for hearing and its effect on subsequent placement on
unrequested leave of absence. In Roseville Education Associa-
220. Id. at 153.
221. Id. The court of appeals stated the procedure "was adequate to meet the
demands of due process for a substitute teacher alleged to have abandoned his posi-
tion." Id. at 153.
222. Schmidt, 349 N.W.2d at 565.
223. See id. (citing Herfindahl v. Independent School Dist. No. 126, 325 N.W.2d
36, 39 (Minn. 1982); Jordahl v. Independent School Dist. No. 129, 302 Minn. 286,
292, 225 N.W.2d 224, 228 (1974); Fisher v. Independent School Dist. No. 118, 298
Minn. 238, 242, 215 N.W.2d 65, 68 (1974)).
224. Id. at 567.
225. See MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 4. For salient text of the statute, see supra
note 213.
226. MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 4. The hearing shall be granted before final
action is taken. Id.
227. See Pinkney v. Independent School Dist. No. 691, 366 N.W.2d 362, 364
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985). In Pinkney, an original copy of the teacher's notice to the
school board was introduced at his hearing, but no showing was made of delivery of
the notice to the board. The court of appeals held the teacher had failed to show a
timely request for hearing had been made. Id. at 365.
228. See MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 4.
229. 380 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 391
N.W.2d 846 (Minn. 1986).
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tion,230 the school board placed thirty-five teachers and two
deans on unrequested leave of absence, and twenty-three
teachers requested a hearing. Before a hearing, the school
board rescinded the proposed leaves for the deans and teach-
ers who had requested a hearing. 23 1 Teachers who did not re-
quest a hearing were deemed to have acquiesced and were
placed on unrequested leave of absence.
2 32
On appeal, the school board moved to dismiss certiorari be-
cause the teachers placed on leave failed to exercise their statu-
tory remedy by not requesting a hearing.233 The court of
appeals disagreed stating review was not precluded by failure
to request a hearing because there is not a statutory right to
appeal actual placement on unrequested leave of absence.
23 4
The court then analyzed whether the school board's actions
were arbitrary. The court of appeals held the school board's
action was arbitrary because it was "based solely upon whether
a teacher had requested a hearing," 23 5 which is not a listed
ground for placement on leave under Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 125.12, subdivision 6b.236 The court stated:
Finally, if we affirm the School Board's decision, every
teacher who is proposed to be placed on unrequested leave
will feel compelled to request a hearing. The resulting bur-
den upon school boards would run counter to the second
policy embedded in Minnesota's teacher contract statutes
allowing school boards the flexibility to deal with declining
enrollments, financial limitations, and the other problems
encountered in the administration of a school system.23 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court heard further arguments in
230. Id. at 513.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 514. The school board argued certiorari is proper only when there
exists no other available remedy. It claimed the teachers' available remedy was to
request a hearing. Id. at 513. The court of appeals emphasized the distinction be-
tween proposed and actual placement on unrequested leave of absence. Id. at 514
(quoting Atwood v. Independent School Dist. No. 51, 354 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Minn.
1984)). The court stated that, while appeal is made statutorily from proposed place-
ment, the statute does not provide appeal from final placement. See id.
235. Id. at 515. "In essence, the board perceived that those who had not re-
quested a hearing were vulnerable and placed them on unrequested leave." Id.
236. A teacher may be placed on unrequested leave of absence "because of dis-
continuance of position, lack of pupils, financial limitations, or merger of classes
caused by consolidation of districts." MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6b.
237. Roseville Educ. Ass'n, 380 N.W.2d at 515.
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Roseville Education Association 23 8 and determined what school
board action a teacher acquiesces in when the teacher does not
request a hearing. It held a teacher acquiesces in two matters.
First, the teacher concedes the school board has sufficient
grounds to eliminate certain positions. Second, the teacher
concedes he lacks seniority to bump a retained teacher.
239
An important caveat emphasized by the supreme court is
that acquiescence is based upon no change of circumstances.
If a teacher's seniority and bumping rights are affected after
expiration of the period to request a hearing, the teacher is
entitled to school district review of newly arisen claims.
240
The supreme court suggested the legislature expand the
scope of the notice of placement on proposed unrequested
leave. The court proposed that notice reflect "the school
board's understanding of the teacher's seniority status."
24 1
This notice would alert a teacher of bumping ability and pro-
vide guidance to measure change in circumstances.
In Grinolds v. Independent School District No. 597,242 the
supreme court held that a school board's inherent managerial
authority to terminate the superintendent did not permit the
school board to terminate the superintendent without a hear-
ing. Grinolds involved a conflict between Minnesota Statutes
sections 123.34, subdivision 9 and 125.12. Section 123.34
provided that, despite section 125.12, subdivisions 6a or 6b,
"no individual shall have a right to employment as a superin-
tendent based on seniority or order of employment in any
district." 2
43
The school board contended this statute gave it the author-
238. 391 N.W.2d 846 (Minn. 1986). The supreme court held certiorari was the
proper remedy because no adequate form ofjudicial review was provided by the stat-
ute. See id. at 849. Eight teachers' claims were dismissed by the supreme court be-
cause their petitions for certiorari were not filed within sixty days after receiving
notice of their placement on unrequested leave. Id.; see In re Pinkney, 353 N.W.2d
676, 677-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
239. Roseville Educ. Ass'n, 391 N.W.2d at 850.
240. See id. at 852. A teacher properly placed on unrequested leave may seek rein-
statement to a revived position pursuant to section 125.12, subdivision 6b(e) of Min-
nesota Statutes. See id. at 851 n.7.
241. Id. at 852.
242. 346 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1984). Grinolds was employed as a school superin-
tendent and an elementary principal. Those positions were eliminated and Grinolds
was reassigned to a full-time teaching position at reduced salary and benefits. The
district hired a half-time supervisor. Id. at 125.
243. MINN. STAT. § 123.34, subd. 9 (1982).
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ity to terminate its superintendent without a hearing. 244 The
court rejected this argument stating that "Section 123.34 does
not remove a superintendent's position from the continuing
contract laws. When a school board terminates a superinten-
dent's contract it must comply with section 125.12."245 Teach-
ers employed in nonteaching positions where the school board
has the discretion to hire whomever they wish continue to be
protected and are afforded a due process hearing.
One of the most significant procedural developments in
Minnesota education law is the absolute requirement of the
hiring of an independent hearing examiner in teacher termina-
tion matters.246 In Schmidt v. Independent School District No. 1,247
the Minnesota Court of Appeals formalized the requirement of
a hearing examiner. Before Schmidt, the Minnesota Supreme
Court had strongly recommended that school boards employ
independent hearing examiners in all cases. 248 The Schmidt
244. Grinolds, 346 N.W.2d at 126.
245. Id. at 127. The supreme court relied on the legislative history of section
123.34, subdivision 9 in concluding its reference to section 125.12 concerned only
hiring and seniority, not removal. Because school boards must work closely with the
district superintendent, it would be inconvenient to allow more senior and less affa-
ble teachers to bump a favored superintendent from his position. See id. It is to that
limited extent section 123.34, subdivision 9 was legislated. Id.
246. By comparison, an independent hearing examiner is not required in school
closing cases. Bena, 381 N.W.2d at 521. While both teacher termination and school
closing hearings are quasi-judicial actions, "the line between judicial, legislative and
administrative action is less clear in school closing cases ..... Id. at 520. Other facts
in addition to the public hearing determine school closings and the opportunity in
termination cases for arbitrary action against an individual does not exist. As a re-
sult, the court of appeals declined "to impose a due process requirement that a hear-
ing officer must conduct school closing cases." Id. at 521.
247. 349 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Presiding at the hearing was chair-
man of the school board who had previously voted to place the teacher on unre-
quested leave of absence. Id. at 565. The court of appeals remanded for hiring of an
independent hearing examiner. Id. at 568-69.
248. See, e.g., Ganyo v. Independent School Dist. No. 832, 311 N.W.2d 497 (Minn.
1981). The Ganyo court stated:
We have questioned the fairness of termination proceedings under our
current statute, which permits local school boards to exercise the three-part
role of prosecutor, judge and jury. Kroll v. Independent School Dist. No. 593,
304 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Minn. 1980); Liffrig v. Independent School Dist. No. 442,
292 N.W.2d 726, 730 (Minn. 1980). In Kroll, decided after the hearing in
petitioner's case was conducted, we emphasized that, absent unusual or ex-
tenuating circumstances, a hearing examiner should be hired in all cases.
304 N.W.2d at 345 n.3. We suggest that the hearing examiner not be lim-
ited to taking evidence but, by analogy to the Administrative Procedure Act,
Minn. Stat. § 15.052, subd. 3 (1980), also make detailed findings and con-
clusions which would then be available to the school board in reaching its
decision on termination. We might add that our review of the record dis-
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court adopted this requirement and refused to permit school
boards to exercise the three-part role of prosecutor, judge and
jury.2 49 The school board contended that an unrequested
leave of absence hearing did not warrant the hiring of an in-
dependent hearing examiner. 250 The court rejected this argu-
ment finding no exceptional circumstances to explain the
board's failure to hire a hearing examiner.251 The court went
on to list those persons it believed were qualified to act as in-
dependent hearing examiners in teacher termination matters.
These persons include retired judges, state hearing examiners,
and arbitrators.
25 2
In Bates v. Independent School District No. 482,253 the court of
appeals clarified that a hearing examiner is not unqualified
merely because he was not among those listed in Schmidt. The
Bates hearing examiner was a lawyer. 254 The court of appeals
stated the Schmidt list was not exclusive and explained, "A
hearing examiner is not conclusively unqualified merely be-
cause he is not among those listed in Schmidt. An independent
showing of bias or lack of qualification or neutrality is
necessary." 2
55
The Bates court further stated a hearing examiner's lack of
experience is not a factor to be considered in determining
qualification. "Were that so, existing hearing examiners would
form an exclusive group and inexperienced and otherwise
closes that the school board here, even though under severe time restraints
and presented with numerous evidentiary problems, conducted the hearing
in a conscientious and fair manner.
Id. at 499 n.2, quoted in Schmidt, 349 N.W.2d at 567.
249. Schmidt, 349 N.W.2d at 568.
250. Id. at 567-68.
251. Id. at 568.
252. Among those qualified to serve as the hearing examiner are:
(1) Retired judges.
(2) A state hearing examiner hired pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 14.55
(Supp. 1983).
(3) An arbitrator qualified by the State Public Employment Relations
Board pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 179.72 (Supp. 1983).
Id.
253. 379 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
254. Id. at 240.
255. Id. at 241. Compare In re Termination of Hahn, 386 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (no inference of bias is raised because the school board's attorney has
appeared before the hearing officer in previous cases) with Pinkney, 366 N.W.2d at
365 (bias indicated when hearing examiner has a matter pending before the involved
school district's attorney who was acting as a hearing examiner in an unrelated
matter).
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qualified persons would be excluded." 256
The court of appeals in In re Termination of the Coaching Con-
tract of Hahn2 57 held the due process rights of statutory notice
and hearing requirements do not apply when a coach's con-
tract is not renewed for a subsequent year. The teacher ar-
gued the decision not to renew constituted termination
triggering the due process requirements of Minnesota Statutes
section 125.121.258 The court concluded the statute was clear
and did not apply. 259
A school board's decision not to renew a coaching contract
does not constitute termination under section 125.121 because
that decision can be made for any reason based on substantial
and competent evidence.260 The court of appeals also held a
letter to the coach stating his contract would not be renewed
was sufficient notice. 26'
These recent cases indicate the court's desire to afford
256. Bates, 379 N.W.2d at 241.
257. 386 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Hahn was employed as head girls'
basketball coach based on a series of one-year contracts. In May, he was given notice
of the board's vote to not renew his contract for the following year. The school
district gave Hahn a hearing although it did not believe he was entitled to one. Id.
258. Id. at 790.
259. The 1984 version of Minnesota Statutes section 125.121, subdivision 1
provides:
Before a district terminates the coaching duties of an employee who is re-
quired to hold a license as an athletic coach from the state board of educa-
tion, the district shall notify the employee in writing and state its reason for
the proposed termination. Within 14 days of receiving this notification, the
employee may request in writing a hearing on the termination before the
board. If a hearing is requested, the board shall hold a hearing within 25
days according to the hearing procedures specified in section 125.12, subdi-
vision 9, and the termination shall not be final except upon the order of the
board after the hearing.
MINN. STAT. § 125.121, subd. 1 (emphasis added). The Hahn court concluded, "A
board decision not to offer an employee coaching duties for a subsequent year does
not constitute a termination." Hahn, 386 N.W.2d at 791.
260. Hahn, 386 N.W.2d at 791. Section 125.121 provides:
Subd. 2. Within ten days after the hearing, the board shall issue a writ-
ten decision regarding the termination. If the board decides to terminate
the employee's coaching duties, the decision shall state the reason on which
it is based and include findings of fact based upon competent evidence in
the record. The board may terminate the employee's duties or not, as it
sees fit, for any reason which is found to be true based on substantial and
competent evidence in the record.
MINN. STAT. § 125.121, subd. 2 (emphasis added). The Hahn court stated section
125.121 does not include the due process requirements of Minn. Stat. §§ 125.12 and
125.17 which permit discharge only based on specific grounds. Coaches are not in-
cluded under sections 125.12 or 125.17.
261. Hahn, 386 N.W.2d at 790-91.
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teachers strong due process protection. In most cases, notions
of due process have been expanded to protect teachers' rights.
Only where it is clear the teachers were not prejudiced by a
school board's actions have the courts rejected teachers' due
process claims. The danger of arbitrary termination of a
teacher's livelihood demands, however, that strong due pro-
cess rights continue to be enforced.
B. Grounds for Unrequested Leave of Absence and Dismissal
The statutory grounds for the placement of a continuing
contract teacher on unrequested leave of absence are con-
tained in Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivisions 6a
and 6b. A teacher may be placed on unrequested leave of ab-
sence "because of discontinuance of position, lack of pupils,
financial limitations, or merger of classes caused by consolida-
tion of districts."
262
This language was interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Laird v. Independent School District No. 31 7.263 In Laird,
the teacher who was placed on unrequested leave of absence
claimed the statutory grounds were not met because a decline
in enrollment had occurred gradually over a number of years
and not in the immediately preceding school year. The
supreme court rejected this argument holding "[t]he drop in
enrollment need not occur in a single school year ... to justify
placing a teacher on unrequested leave." 264
The teacher in Laird also claimed the statutory language al-
lowing the school district to place teachers on unrequested
leave of absence "as may be necessary" required an absolute
showing of necessity. 265 The Laird court rejected this argu-
ment. Once the school board has shown that the statutory
grounds for placing a teacher on unrequested leave of absence
exists, the school board is afforded some discretion to deter-
262. MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subds. 6(a) (negotiated unrequested leave of absence
between the school board and the teachers' exclusive bargaining representative), and
6(b) (unrequested leave of absence ordered by school board). A single statutory
ground is sufficent to support placement on unrequested leave of absence. Bates, 379
N.W.2d at 242.
263. 346 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 1984).
264. Id. at 156. The supreme court concluded that whether enrollment declines
occur in one year or gradually over several years does not alter the specific reason for
reducing the number of teachers employed by the district. Id.
265. Id. at 155.
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mine the number of teachers to be placed on unrequested
leave of absence. 26
6
Minnesota courts have also had several opportunities to dis-
cuss what constitutes sufficient grounds for terminating teach-
ers. Two statutory termination procedures exist for dismissing
teachers under Minnesota Statutes section 125.12.267 The dif-
ference in the procedures turns upon the remediability of the
misconduct. 26
8
Section 125.12, subdivision 6 presumes remediability.
Under that procedure, the teacher is "given written notice of
the specific items of complaint and reasonable time within
which to remedy them."269 If the deficiencies are not cor-
rected, the teacher may be terminated at the end of the school
year. Appropriate grounds for applying this procedure are set
forth in subdivision 6.270
Section 125.12, subdivision 8 provides grounds for immedi-
ate discharge. These grounds involve more serious miscon-
duct and presume irremediability. This misconduct includes
immoral conduct, conduct unbecoming a teacher, and willful
neglect of duty.271
In 1985, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed the appli-
cation of the two procedures in two cases. In Russell v. Special
266. Id. at 156. The supreme court stated that a school board's flexibility in effec-
tively administering the operation of public schools is not eliminated by the unre-
quested leave of absence statute. See id. at 155.
267. See MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subds. 6, 8.
268. Id.
269. Id. § 125.12, subd. 6.
270. Subd. 6. Grounds for termination. A continuing contract may be termi-
nated, effective at the close of the school year, upon any of the following
grounds:
(a) Inefficiency;
(b) Neglect of duty, or persistent violation of school laws, rules, regula-
tions, or directives;
(c) Conduct unbecoming a teacher which materially impairs his educa-
tional effectiveness;
(d) Other good and sufficient grounds rendering the teacher unfit to per-
form his duties.
A contract shall not be terminated upon one of the grounds specified in
clauses (a), (b), (c), or (d), unless the teacher shall have failed to correct the
deficiency after being given written notice of the specific items of complaint
and reasonable time within which to remedy them.
Id.
271. Subdivision 8 states:
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School District No. 6,272 a physical education teacher was dis-
missed under subdivision 8 for physically abusing students.
Russell had originally received a deficiency notice pursuant to
subdivision 6.273 The letter listed nine deficiencies and di-
rected Russell to avoid all corporal punishment. 274 Subse-
quent continued misconduct resulted in his immediate
termination 275
Russell argued the school district waived its right to termi-
nate him pursuant to subdivision 8 after it served him with sub-
division 6 notice. 276 The court of appeals held the school
district was not precluded from immediately terminating Rus-
sell.277 Which termination procedure applies will be deter-
mined by the remediability of that conduct. 278 At first,
Russell's conduct appeared correctable, but his subsequent
conduct of striking a student, shoving him against a wall, grab-
bing his throat, and grinding his fist in the student's face was
so outrageous as to be irremediable. 279
Immediate discharge. A school board may discharge a continuing-con-
tract teacher, effective immediately, upon any of the following grounds:
(a) Immoral conduct, insubordination, or conviction of a felony;
(b) Conduct unbecoming a teacher which requires the immediate re-
moval of the teacher from his classroom or other duties;
(c) Failure without justifiable cause to teach without first securing the
written release of the school board;
(d) Gross inefficiency which the teacher has failed to correct after rea-
sonable written notice;
(e) Willful neglect of duty; or
(f) Continuing physical or mental disability subsequent to a twelve
months leave of absence and inability to qualify for reinstatement in accord-
ance with subdivision 7.
Prior to discharging a teacher the board shall notify the teacher in writ-
ing and state its ground for the proposed discharge in reasonable detail.
Within ten days after receipt of this notification the teacher may make a writ-
ten request for a hearing before the board and it shall be granted before
final action is taken. The board may, however, suspend a teacher with pay
pending the conclusion of such hearing and determination of the issues
raised therein after charges have been filed which constitute grounds for
discharge.
Id. § 125.12, subd. 8.
272. 366 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
273. Id. at 704.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 702. Russell's deficiency notice resulted from his "confrontive style
of discipline" and striking of students. Id.
276. Id. at 704-05.
277. Id. at 705.
278. Id. When prior rude behavior is not documented by written warning,
remediability is a possibility and immediate dismissal is not justified. See Beranek v.
Joint Indep. School Dist. No. 287, No. C2-86-790 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1986).
279. Russell, 366 N.W.2d at 705. The court of appeals stated a factor in determin-
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Russell claimed his previous conduct was irrelevant in deter-
mining whether his subsequent conduct qualified as a subdivi-
sion 8 offense. 280 The court of appeals disagreed and quoted
Kroll v. Independent School District No. 593,281 where the supreme
court stated the "prior record of a teacher in disciplinary pro-
ceedings must always be considered under either termination
procedure." 28 2 Thus, past conduct is relevant in determining a
teacher's remediability.
In Downie v. Independent School District No. 141,283 the teacher
served for four years as a full-time junior high school guidance
counselor. During that period, Downie was never repri-
manded or notified of any deficiencies. 28 4 He was subse-
quently terminated under subdivision 8 for being involved in a
weight-loss bet with two ninth grade females which included
terms involving sexual favors.285 Downie also breached the
confidentiality of counseled students and was generally sexu-
ally crude when speaking to students.286
Downie claimed the school district improperly applied sub-
ing remediability is whether the teacher's conduct has caused actual or threatened
harm. Id. (quoting Kroll v. Independent School Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338, 346
(Minn. 1981)). Here, Russell's notice of immediate termination stated the following
as grounds:
Insubordination, conduct unbecoming a teacher which requires your imme-
diate removal from your duties and from the classroom, gross inefficiency
which you have failed to correct after reasonable written notice, and willful
neglect of duty, consisting of the following:
1. Striking or hitting a student.
2. Pushing or pulling a student by the hair.
3. Pushing or pulling a student by the arms.
4. Pushing, shoving or throwing a student against a bench, wall or locker.
5. Grabbing or holding a student by the throat.
6. Grinding or shoving your hand or fist into the face or chin of a student.
7. Failure to follow an assertive discipline plan properly ....
8. Failure to avoid using physical force ....
9. Failure to avoid using corporal punishment ....
10. Failure to exercise proper or adequate self-control ....
11. Failure to develop proper relationships with students ....
Id. at 704.
280. Id. at 703. Russell argued past conduct is irrelevant because committing a
subdivision 8 offense is sufficient on its own to warrant termination. Id. at 704.
281. 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981). The supreme court concluded the school
board's decision to dismiss under subdivision 8 was arbitrary and unreasonable given
a single act of misconduct in 23 years of teaching. See id. at 346.
282. Id. at 345, quoted in Russell, 366 N.W.2d at 704.
283. 367 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), petition for rev. denied (Minn. July 26,
1985).
284. Id. at 915.
285. Id.
286. See id.
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division 8 instead of subdivision 6 given his previous lack of
misconduct and lack of warning.28 7 Again, the court of appeals
focused on remediability stating:
Several factors should be weighed when determining
remediability: the prior record of the teacher; the severity
of the conduct in light of the teacher's record; whether the
conduct resulted in actual or threatened harm, either physi-
cal or psychological; and whether the conduct could have
been corrected had the teacher been warned by superiors.
Furthermore, school boards are not required to wait for
harm to come to their students before discharging a
teacher.2
88
The court concluded subdivision 8 was properly applied. 28 9
Downie, as a counselor, did not need to be warned that breach-
ing confidentialities was improper conduct. 290 Given his rela-
tionship with counselees, Downie's use of his influential
position to exploit impressionable students was outrageous
and the psychological harm caused or threatened was
evident.2
91
In Fisher v. Independent School District No. 622,292 the court of
appeals held "[p]roof of a teacher's sexual acts with a student
287. Id. at 917. He also argued his conduct was not sufficiently egregious to war-
rant immediate termination. Id.
288. Id. (citing Kroll, 304 N.W.2d at 345-46).
289. Id. at 918.
290. See id.
291. See Downie, 367 N.W.2d at 917. The court of appeals stated:
Downie was a junior high school counselor who counseled students on a
one-to-one basis. His was a very influential and sensitive position. Because
of his role as counselor, students confided in Downie to a much greater ex-
tent than they would in a teacher of English or math. The potential for
students to be greatly harmed or greatly aided by their relationship with
Downie was substantial. His impact on the lives of impressionable young
people ofjunior high school age was great. Arguably, he should be held to
an even greater standard of care and sensitivity than teachers in other
disciplines.
The most serious of the charges against Downie and certainly the conduct
which has the most potential for causing long-lasting harm to students is
that upon numerous occasions he breached the confidentiality of students
who came to him for counseling. We find particularly offensive Downie's
disclosure of an incest victim's confidences to teachers in a social setting
who had no compelling professional need for such information. The school
nurse's testimony supports that such a disclosure could have devastating
psychological consequences for the victim should she ever discover that
Downie made such a disclosure.
Id.
292. 357 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Fisher, an elementary school princi-
pal, was terminated on charges he sexually molested a male student over a period of
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is uniformly held to be sufficient grounds for dismissal." 29 3
The court of appeals upheld the teacher's termination in Fisher
although the acts complained of occurred twelve to sixteen
years before the teacher's dismissal. The teacher had com-
plained the acts were too remote in time to afford him due pro-
cess, but the court of appeals held "it may be considered
doubtful whether such conduct could ever be too remote in
time. "294
In Ostlund v. Independent School District No. 47,295 a principal
was dismissed for failing to complete teacher evaluations. The
principal had been warned in prior years to complete required
teacher evaluation forms. 296 After the principal failed to cor-
rect the situation, the school board gave him a written defi-
ciency notice.297 The court of appeals held the school board
had sufficient grounds to terminate the principal. 298
Marshall County Central Education Association v. Independent
School District No. 441 299 contains an interesting analysis of the
relationship between Minnesota's statute relating to teacher
probationary periods300 and the Minnesota Public Employees
four years. At the time of the discharge hearing, the involved student was 23 years
old and the father of three of his own children. See id. at 153-54.
293. Id. at 155.
294. Id. at 156 (quotingJohnson v. Independent School Dist. No. 294, No. 12305,
slip op. at 17 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 12, 1980). The court of appeals noted that subdi-
vision 8 of section 125.12 did not contain a limitations period. Id. at 155.
295. 354 N.W.2d 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
296. See id. at 493-94.
297. Id.
298. See Ostlund, 354 N.W.2d 492.
299. 363 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
300. The first and second consecutive years of a teacher's first teaching expe-
rience in Minnesota in a single school district shall be deemed to be a proba-
tionary period of employment, and after completion thereof, the
probationary period in each school district in which he is thereafter em-
ployed shall be one year. A teacher who has complied with the then applica-
ble probationary requirements in a school district prior toJuly 1, 1967, shall
not be required to serve a new probationary period in the said district subse-
quent thereto. During the probationary period any annual contract with any
teacher may or may not be renewed as the school board shall see fit; pro-
vided, however, that the school board shall give any such teacher whose
contract it declines to renew for the following school year written notice to
that effect before June 1. If the teacher requests reasons for any non re-
newal of a teaching contract, the school board shall give the teacher its rea-
son in writing, including a statement that appropriate supervision was
furnished describing the nature and the extent of such supervision fur-
nished the teacher during his employment by the board, within ten days
after receiving such request. The school board may, after a hearing held
upon due notice, discharge a teacher during the probationary period for
cause, effective immediately under section 123.35, subdivision 5.
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Labor Relations Act. 30 1 In Marshall County, a teacher was hired
for a one year contract to teach a one-half time art instructor's
position.30 2 She was not a continuing contract teacher.
30 3
Sometime during the contract year, the teacher filed a griev-
ance claiming she was being assigned more than a half-time
teaching assignment. 30 4 She claimed she was not allowed suffi-
cient preparation time and that her salary was inadequate.
30 5
When the school board was considering the teacher's em-
ployment for the following school year, the board adopted a
resolution to terminate the teacher's contract at the end of the
current school year for her "lack of cooperation.-3 0 6 The
teacher, however, had performed all the terms of her teaching
contract. The principal of the school where the teacher was
teaching commended her for teaching proficiency.
30 7
The court of appeals was forced to determine if the school
board's action was appropriate under seemingly conflicting
statutes. Under the applicable teacher statute, a probationary
teacher could be terminated by the school board at will. 30 8 In
the past, the courts had construed the teacher statute as vest-
ing the board with "unlimited discretion"30 9 to renew a proba-
tionary teacher's contract.
3 10
Under the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations
Act (PELRA),31 however, "a public employee may not be ter-
MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 3.
301. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.61-.76 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 179A.01-.23 (1984)).
302. Marshall County, 363 N.W.2d 127-28.
303. Id. at 127.
304. Id. at 128.
305. Id. at 127-28. Had the teacher's contract for the following school year been
renewed, she would have acquired continuing contract rights. Id. The teacher's
grievance was denied by the school principal based on a letter written by the superin-
tendent which demonstrated that the teacher had been assigned duties just under
half the required time commitment of full-time teaching duties. The grievance was
then submitted to the superintendent as required, but was later withdrawn. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 3 ("During the probationary period any an-
nual contract with any teacher may or may not be renewed as the school board shall
see fit.").
309. See, e.g., Skeim v. Independent School Dist. No. 115, 305 Minn. 464, 473, 234
N.W.2d 806, 812 (1975); Pearson v. Independent School Dist. No. 716, 290 Minn.
400, 402, 188 N.W.2d 776, 778 (1971).
310. See Marshall County, 363 N.W.2d at 129.
311. MINN. STAT. § 179A.01-.23 (1984) (current version). PELRA was designed to
resolve disputes between public employers and their employees. Its provisions in-
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minated for submitting a grievance. "312 The Marshall County
court held the probationary teacher was a public employee and
that the provisions of PELRA were controlling. 31 3 The court
held the board's claim of lack of cooperation "was a mere pre-
text to terminate [the teacher] for exercising her statutory
right to assert a grievance under PELRA." 314 Consequently,
the court held the provisions of Minnesota Statutes section
125.12, subdivision 3 were not applicable and that PELRA lim-
its a school board's discretionary power to terminate proba-
tionary teachers.3
t 5
Recent developments in this area indicate school boards
have considerable discretion in placing teachers on unre-
quested leave or terminating their employment. While
grounds must be clearly stated, cause for the school board's
action need not occur within a single school year nor within
immediate school years. Further, the court will uphold a
school board's decision to immediately discharge a teacher if
the teacher's wrongful conduct is demonstrated as irremedia-
ble. Recent cases demonstrate school boards have an obliga-
tion to protect their pupils from teacher misconduct and that
school boards have a right to act in the district's financial best
interests.
C. Seniority and Bumping Rights
1. General Principles
One of the most litigated areas in school law has been the
seniority rights of teachers placed on unrequested leave of ab-
sence. Generally, the rule is that teachers must be placed on
unrequested leave of absence "in the inverse order in which
they were employed by the school district." 316 Seniority rights
clude unfair labor practices, negotiation procedures, mediation, arbitration, and vari-
ous employer and employee rights and obligations.
312. Marshall County, 363 N.W.2d at 129 (citing Ekstedt v. Village of New Hope,
292 Minn. 152, 193 N.W.2d 821 (1972) where the supreme court interpreted the
predecessor to MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 1 (1982) found at MINN. STAT. § 179.52
(1969)).
313. Marshall County, 363 N.W.2d at 130.
314. Id.
315. See id.
316. The applicable Minnesota Statute provides:
Teachers who have acquired continuing contract rights shall be placed
on unrequested leave of absence in fields in which they are licensed in the
inverse order in which they were employed by the school district. In the
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are violated if a teacher is placed on unrequested leave and a
qualified licensed teacher with less seniority is retained. 3'
7
The most straightforward application of this principle is con-
tained in Pearson v. School Board of Independent School District No.
381.318 Pearson involved a teacher who met with the disfavor of
the school board. 319 After several unsuccessful attempts to ter-
minate the teacher's employment, the school board placed the
teacher on unrequested leave of absence in 1981.320 At the
same meeting where the school board terminated Pearson,
however, the board voted to hire a new full-time math teacher
and a new part-time special education director. 321 These were
positions the laid off teacher was licensed and qualified to
teach.322
Applying Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 6b,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held, "Pearson should have
been offered another position for which he was qualified. Any
'teacher' under section 125.12(1) qualified for a position with
greater seniority than another 'teacher' in the position may
take the less senior teacher's position." 323
In Berger v. Independent School District No. 706,324 the court of
appeals held teachers do not forfeit seniority when granted ex-
tended leaves of absence pursuant to the Minnesota teacher
mobility statute, Minnesota Statutes section 125.60.325 The
case of equal seniority, the order in which teachers who have acquired con-
tinuing contract rights shall be placed on unrequested leave of absence in
fields in which they are licensed shall be negotiable.
MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6b(b).
317. See Bye v. Special Intermediate School Dist. No. 916, 379 N.W.2d 653, 659-
60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), petition for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1986).
318. 356 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
319. Id. at 440.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 441 (quoting Roseville Educ. Ass'n v. Independent School Dist. No.
623, 353 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
324. 362 N.W.2d 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). In 1978, Robert Chopp was granted
a five-year leave of absence pursuant to section 125.60 of Minnesota Statutes. In
1982, Chopp spoke with the district superintendent about extending his leave. The
school board eventually approved the extended leave untilJanuary 1983 without loss
of seniority. Dennis Berger, a teacher less senior to Chopp by one year, filed a griev-
ance claiming Chopp should have lost seniority to the extent of his extended leave.
See id. at 370-71.
325. Id. at 373. Preserving seniority fulfills the purpose of section 125.60 to allow
and encourage teachers to pursue additional education and professional expansion.
See id. see also Urdahl v. Independent School Dist. No. 181, No. C7-86-1045 (Minn.
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court noted, however, that the statute limits extended leaves to
five years. When a teacher is granted an additional year of
general leave, his seniority is forfeited. 326 General leaves are
not subject to the teacher mobility statute.3 27
Vettleson v. Special School District No. 1 328 held a school district
may be sued for misrepresentation for using an inaccurate sen-
iority list when proposing to place teachers on unrequested
leave of absence. In Vettleson, the school district proposed a
layoff for a school counselor.3 29 The counselor requested a
hearing and, at the hearing, was granted a one-year leave of
absence to take employment in another district at lower pay.3 3 0
Subsequently, the counselor became aware that the school dis-
trict had retained a more senior counselor who had been unli-
censed for two years.33' The laid off counselor then brought
an action against the school district for misrepresentation.3 3 2
The court of appeals held the teacher had a valid claim. It
held the school district engaged in misrepresentation by post-
ing an inaccurate seniority list for guidance counselors which
included the unlicensed counselor. Since the laid off coun-
selor relied on this list and took another job with less pay, the
misrepresentation claim was actionable. Although the school
district claimed it was not aware that the unlicensed teacher
was working with an expired license, the court held good faith
is not a defense to a claim of misrepresentation. 33 3
Roseville Education Association v. Independent School District No.
623 334 analyzed how a teacher's seniority rights affect the
teacher's right to bump into administrative positions. In Rose-
ville, the district employed six persons as deans.33 5 The dean
Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1986) (a negotiated plan cannot modify the provisions of section
125.60 to deny seniority credit to teachers on extended leave of absence).
326. Berger, 362 N.W.2d at 374.
327. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 125.60, subd. 4).
328. 361 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
329. Id. at 427.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See id. "Vettleson, as the most senior counselor laid off, would have been
retained had the license expiration been discovered." Id.
333. See id. at 428. The court of appeals held that the school district "had a duty
to investigate the licensure status of its senior teachers." Id. The court stated that
such a duty is "strongly implied by statute." Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 125.11,
125.12, subds. 4, 6b(b)).
334. 353 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
335. Id. at 692.
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position was an administrative supervisory position.33 6 The
district, however, required all persons employed as deans to
hold teaching licenses.33 7
The school district proposed to place two teachers on leaves
of absence who had greater seniority than one of the deans."s 8
The teachers claimed they should have been assigned a dean's
position because their seniority was greater than that of the
dean.3 3 9 The court of appeals adopted this position stating,
"The statute is unambiguous. Its plain meaning is that all
'teachers' within the statutory definition of the term are subject
to the seniority claims of other teachers. No distinction is
made between administrative and teaching positions."3 40
Thus, the Roseville court allowed the teachers to bump into the
deans' positions. 341
In Renstrom v. Independent School District No. 261,342 a teacher
in the Ashby school district was placed on unrequested leave.
Pursuant to a joint powers agreement under Minnesota Stat-
utes section 471.69, subdivision 1, students wishing to take
courses previously taught by Renstrom were sent to the Evans-
ville school district for instruction by a less senior teacher.
Renstrom claimed she was entitled to reinstatement pursuant
to Minnesota Statutes section 122.541.343
Minnesota Statutes section 122.541 provides that:
The boards of two or more school districts may, after con-
sultation with the department of education, enter into an
agreement providing for the discontinuance by a district of
any of grades kindergarten through 12 or portions of those
grades and the instruction in a cooperating district of the
pupils in the discontinued grades or portions of grades .... 344
Under this section, senior teachers may retain their employ-
ment to "teach in a cooperating district as exchange teachers
336. See id. at 692-93.
337. Id. at 693.
338. Id. at 692.
339. See id. at 692-93.
340. Id. at 693 (citing Op. Att'y Gen. 172-d (1975),foundin 8 Minn. Legal Reg. 52,
56 (1975)).
341. See id. at 694. Cf. Evans v. Independent School Dist. No. 281, No. C4-86-
1181 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1981) (administrators without district classroom
teaching experience may bump less senior classroom teachers).
342. 390 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
343. See id. at 27.
344. MINN. STAT. § 122.541, subd. 1 (1984) (emphasis added).
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"345
The court of appeals reluctantly rejected Renstrom's claim
that section 122.541 applied to her case. Review of the legisla-
tive history showed "portion of grades" was meant to consist
of more than a few courses. The court stated:
Under these circumstances, we are constrained to read sec-
tion 122.541 to apply only to instances where grades or
portions of grades are discontinued and those students af-
fected receive all their instruction in another school district.
Section 122.541 does not apply where students are trans-
ported to another school district to take one or two classes
that have been discontinued in their district but continue to
receive the remainder of their education in the school dis-
trict where they reside.3 46
While Renstrom may provide a sympathetic case, the court of
appeals properly ascertained legislative intent and correctly
did not apply section 122.541.
2. Realignment of Assignments-Dreyer, Strand, and
Brandhorst
In State ex rel. Dreyer v. Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 542,34 7 the supreme court discussed the efforts a
school board should make to realign positions when partially
eliminating a position. Dreyer involved a principal whose posi-
tion was reduced from a full-time position to a half-time posi-
tion.3 48 At the same time, a full-time teaching position became
available in the district.349 The school district offered the prin-
cipal his choice of either the half-time principal position or the
full-time teaching position. 350 The principal's request that he
be given a position consisting of a half-time principal assign-
ment and a half-time teaching assignment was rejected by the
school district.351
The supreme court remanded the matter holding it would
have been appropriate for the hearing examiner to take evi-
dence and make findings regarding the parties' proposals for
345. Id. subd. 5.
346. Renstrom, 390 N.W.2d at 28.
347. 344 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. 1984).
348. Id. at 412.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. Dreyer did accept the full-time teaching position subject to his rights in
this appeal. Id. at 413.
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reassignment. Since the hearing examiner had not considered
the issue, the supreme court found it impossible to determine
whether the school district was arbitrary and unreasonable by
failing to make the principal's proposed reassignment.3 52
One of the most significant recent education law cases is
Strand v. Special School District No. 1.353 Strand involved an ap-
peal by several teachers placed on unrequested leave of ab-
sence. Strand was a tenured teacher employed by the district
since 1972.3 54 Her position was terminated in 1984 because of
discontinuance of position and lack of pupils. 355 She con-
tended that a more senior teacher should have been reassigned
in the district to protect her seniority rights. 356 If the more
senior teacher would have been reassigned, Strand could have
filled that teacher's position and a less senior teacher would
have been terminated. 357 Thus, the issue was whether the ap-
plicable provisions of the Teacher Tenure Act required the re-
assignment of a more senior teacher to accommodate the
seniority position of a less senior teacher who was proposed
for termination. 358
The court first discussed the concept of position. A teacher
less senior than Strand had been assigned a position consisting
of .6 work experience and .4 child development. The school
district contended this assignment constituted one position
and that Strand could not teach the .4 child development as-
signment for which she was qualified and licensed. 359 The
352. Id. at 413-14. Because Dreyer was not actually leaving the employ of the
school district, the supreme court concluded the case did not involve bumping or
realignment of teachers. Id. at 413. The parties argued the issue of whether section
125.12 requires realignment in the case of unrequested leave, but because of its con-
clusion, the court expressly stated the opinion had no precedential value as to that
issue. See id. at 413 n.2.
353. 361 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 392
N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1986).
354. Strand, 361 N.W. 2d at 71.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 72.
357. See id.
358. Id. Strand was licensed to teach both home economics and child develop-
ment. Senior to her was Jessie Busse who was licensed to teach home economics,
work experience and child development. Less senior to Strand wasJanell Olson who
was licensed to teach work experience and child development. Strand claimed Busse
should have been reassigned to fill the position ultimately given Olson, Strand
should have assumed Busse's former position and Olson, the least senior, should
have been placed on unrequested leave. Id. at 71.
359. See id.
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court of appeals, quoting Berland v. Special School District No.
1,360 stated, " 'Position' within the context of Minn. Stat.
§ 125.17 is that subject area and grade level for which the
teacher is qualified as evidenced by licensure from the State of
Minnesota."
361
The court held Strand should have been assigned to the .4
child development position.3 62 The court of appeals believed
defining position as an area of state licensure best effectuated
the purposes of the Teacher Tenure Act.
We believe the board's definition of "position" as any par-
ticular grouping of different areas of licensure is too restric-
tive under Berland. This definition of position would permit
the arbitrary combination of different areas of licensure into
one "position" and circumvent teachers' tenure rights.
3 63
The court then addressed Strand's realignment argument.
Since Strand had demonstrated the possibility of shifting a
more senior teacher to accommodate her seniority rights, the
court agreed that realignment should have taken place.
"When reducing teaching staffs, the school district is required,
whenever possible, to retain its most senior teachers, by rea-
sonable realignment if necessary." 364 Although the court rec-
ognized its holding placed a limitation on the management
powers of the school district, the court believed a teacher's
seniority rights were more important under the
circumstances. 365
In Strand, another teacher, Barbara Johnson, claimed she
was improperly terminated because the school district retained
360. 314 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn. 1981). Berland was a consolidation of three ap-
peals each involving teacher termination under Minnesota Statutes section 125.17,
subdvision 4(5). Each teacher claimed entitlement to the position based on seniority.
See id. at 810. Regarding one of the teachers who was reinstated, the supreme court
stated that the school district's position that "bumping" was not allowed or man-
dated by the Teacher Tenure Act "would have the inevitable effect of discouraging
teachers from ever pursuing specialized training or attaining multiple licensure." Id.
at 812.
361. Strand, 361 N.W.2d at 72-73.
362. Id. at 73.
363. Id. (citing Hayes v. Board of Educ., 103 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502, 431 N.E.2d
690, 693 (1982)).
364. Id. (quoting Proch v. New Castle Area School Dist., 60 Pa. Commw. 111, 112,
430 A.2d 1034, 1035 (1981)).
365. Id. (citing with approval Welsko v. School Board, 383 Pa. 390, 394, 119 A.2d
43, 45 (1956)). The danger in not intervening would be the likelihood that seniority
status would be circumvented by reassignment. See id.
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a more senior teacher who was past the mandatory age of re-
tirement. Johnson claimed the school district's retention of a
teacher past mandatory retirement age contravened several
Minnesota statutes and the school district's own policy on
compulsory retirement.3 66 The court of appeals held the
board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily and under an erroneous
theory of law by terminating Johnson while retaining the more
senior teacher who had passed the mandatory retirement
age.
3 6 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Strand368 affirmed the court of appeals' reinstatement of
Strand but reversed the intermediate court's reinstatement of
Johnson. The opinion provides definite guidance regarding
both issues.
In concluding that Johnson was not entitled to bump a 72-
year-old teacher, the supreme court rejected the court of ap-
peals' statutory interpretation. The intermediate court relied
on the school district's written policy which stated, "Any
teacher who has attained the age of 70 as ofJune 30 of any year
shall be automatically retired and removed from the services of
the school system." 369 The court of appeals also concluded
Johnson should have been reinstated because Minnesota Stat-
utes sections 181.81, subdivision l(b)3 7 0 and 354A.21 3 71 sup-
ported termination of the older, but more senior, teacher.372
The supreme court found nothing in section 181.81 preclud-
ing waiver of compulsory retirement by the school district and
the teacher. It also stated that even if the written policy was
incorporated as part of the older teacher's employment con-
tract, Johnson did not have standing to enforce that term.373
The court additionally concluded the older teacher was not a
366. Id. at 74. Minnesota Statutes section 354A.21 requires termination when a
teacher reaches age 70 years. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 181.81, subd. 1,
354A.011, subds. 1, 27 and 354A.05 (1984).
367. Strand, 361 N.W.2d at 75.
368. 392 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1986), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 361 N.W.2d 69
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
369. Strand, 361 N.W.2d at 74.
370. "Employment shall continue... until the employee reaches the compulsory
retirement age established by the employer." MINN. STAT. § 181.81, subd. l(b).
371. "[A] teacher subject to the provisions of this chapter shall terminate employ-
ment at the end of the academic year in which the teacher reaches the age of 70." Id.
§ 354A.21 (1984).
372. Strand, 361 N.W.2d at 74.
373. The court stated that Johnson was not a third-party beneficiary of the older
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"teacher" as defined by section 354A.01 1374 and, therefore,
was not subject to the provisions of chapter 354A. 375
Most significantly, the supreme court emphasized that at-
tainment of a specified age is not a statutory ground for dis-
charge under the Teacher Tenure Act.3 76 While school boards
not in cities of the first class may require its continuing con-
tract teachers to retire at age 70, no similar statutory provision
exists regarding tenured teachers.3 77 Reacting to this differ-
ence, the supreme court stated that given "this apparently de-
liberate omission of authority to provide by rule for
compulsory retirement, we regard the school district's policy
of mandatory retirement at age 70 as unenforceable under the
Teacher Tenure Act." 378 School districts in cities of the first
class negotiating with tenured teachers should also note the
supreme court's directive that compulsory retirement is not a
teacher's employment contract. Strand, 392 N.W.2d at 886 (citing Cretex Co. v. Con-
struction Leaders, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 135 (Minn. 1984)).
374. "Teacher" means any person who renders service in a public school dis-
trict located in the corporate limits of one of the cities of the first class which
was so classified on January 1, 1979 as any of the following:
(a) a full time employee in a position for which a valid license from the
state board of education is required;
(b) an employee of the teachers retirement fund association located in
the city of the first class unless the employee has exercised the option pursu-
ant to Laws 1955, Chapter 10, Section 1, to retain membership in the Min-
neapolis employees retirement fund established pursuant to chapter 422A;
(c) a part time employee in a position for which a valid license from
the state board of education is required who also renders other non-teach-
ing services for the school district unless the board of trustees of the teacher
retirement fund association determines that the combined employment is
on the whole so substantially dissimilar to teaching service that the service
shall not be covered by the association.
MINN. STAT. § 354A.01 1, subd. 27. The supreme court found none of the qualifica-
tions applied to the involved teacher. See Strand, 392 N.W.2d at 887.
375. See Strand, 392 N.W.2d at 887.
376. Causes for the discharge or demotion of a teacher either during or after
the probationary period shall be:
(1) Immoral character, conduct unbecoming a teacher, or insubordi-
nation;
(2) Failure without justifiable cause to teach without first securing the
written release of the school board having the care, management, or control
of the school in which the teacher is employed;
(3) Inefficiency in teaching or in the management of a school;
(4) Affliction with active tuberculosis or other communicable disease
shall be considered as cause for removal or suspension while the teacher is
suffering from such disability; or
(5) Discontinuance of position or lack of pupils.
MINN. STAT. § 125.17, subd. 4.
377. "Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, a board may provide by rule that
its teachers shall be retired at age 70." Id. § 125.12, subd. 5.
378. Strand, 392 N.W.2d at 887.
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term which may be incorporated into a collective bargaining
agreement.3
79
Regarding Strand, the supreme court began its analysis by
stating that "[fiundamental to the disposition of Strand's claim
is the development of a practical definition of the term 'posi-
tion' for purposes of the Teacher Tenure Act." 38 0 The court
noted, however, that "it is impossible to articulate a precise
definition," 38' but explained that "[t]he difficulty in articulat-
ing a precise definition reflects the fact that although the legis-
lature has clearly adopted a policy strongly favoring the
retention of senior teachers, it has also made it clear that pub-
lic school districts must be accorded sufficient flexibility to ef-
fectively administer the schools."
382
The supreme court's solution was to provide several factors
which school boards must consider in implementing the
court's ruling that "the Teacher Tenure Act mandates a rea-
sonable realignment of course assignments for the protection
of seniority rights .... 383 A school district must examine
"the teacher's length of service, the duration and scope of the
teacher's license, the school district's needs reflecting the wel-
fare of the students and the public, and the ease of reassign-
ment or realignment of course schedules . *.".."384 The
supreme court also directed school districts to consider these
factors in "developing anticipatory plans designed to dis-
tribute teaching assignments among the senior tenured
teachers."385
In essence, school districts must now, when practical and
reasonable, reassign or realign teaching duties to retain senior
teachers. While each class hour assigned to a teacher is not a
protectable "position," a multi-subject teaching assignment is
not a "position."3 86 A multiple-licensed teacher is subject to
reassignment to any licensed subject whether requested or not,
but will, on the other hand, be more likely to retain
379. Id.
380. Id at 884.
381. Id. at 885.
382. Id. (citing Laird v. Independent School Dist. No. 317, 346 N.W.2d 153, 155
(Minn. 1984)).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See id.
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employment. 387
In a companion case to Strand, the Minnesota Supreme
Court clarified that the duration of a work assignment does not
affect the substance of a teaching position. In Brandhorst v. Spe-
cial School District No. 1,388 Manston, a teacher holding a thirty-
eight-week position which was being discontinued, sought to
bump into a forty-six-week position requiring the same licen-
sure taught by a teacher with less seniority. The school district
rejected Manston's claim concluding the reassignment would
constitute a promotion not required by the Teacher Tenure
Act.38
9
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals and held
that the two positions were essentially the same. Although one
assignment was eight weeks longer and caused an increase in
total wages, the reassignment was not a promotion.
3 90
Seniority rights provide a basis for determining which teach-
ers remain in available positions. Long years of service should
be rewarded by job security. Seniority lists can be quite com-
plex as demonstrated by Strand. Currently, a teacher's "posi-
tion" may consist of varied work assignments. When reducing
active staff, school boards must consider teachers' full qualifi-
cations and licensure.
D. Negotiated Plans vs. Statutory Rights
In 1974, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the statutory
provisions for placing teachers on unrequested leave of ab-
sence.39' Those provisions were intended to provide the
school district more flexibility in dealing with declining enroll-
ment while, at the same time, affording greater protection for
teachers' seniority rights. Under Minnesota Statutes section
125.12, subdivision 6a, a school board and the teachers' bar-
gaining representative may negotiate a plan providing for un-
387. See id. at 886. In Strand, Busse, the most senior teacher involved, would be
reassigned as the work experience coordinator even though she had not requested to
be assigned that position. The court concluded that change did not constitute dis-
placement or bumping. Id. at 885-86.
388. 392 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1986), aff'g 365 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
389. Id. at 889.
390. Id. at 889-90 (citing Strand, 392 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1986); State ex rel. Haak v.
Board of Educ., 367 N.W.2d 461, 467 (Minn. 1985)).
391. See 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 458, at 1127-29.
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requested leave of absence. 392 If a plan is not negotiated, the
provisions and procedures contained in section 125.12, subdi-
vision 6b apply.
393
Subdivision 6b contains detailed procedures for placing
teachers on unrequested leave of absence.3 94 A conflict has
392. Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 6a provides:
The school board and the exclusive bargaining representative of the teach-
ers may negotiate a plan providing for unrequested leave of absence without
pay or fringe benefits for as many teachers as may be necessary because of
discontinuance of position, lack of pupils, financial limitations, or merger of
classes caused by consolidation of districts. Failing to successfully negotiate
such a plan, the provisions of subdivision 6b shall apply. The negotiated
plan shall not include provisions which would result in the exercise of sen-
iority by a teacher holding a provisional license, other than a vocational edu-
cational license, contrary to the provisions of subdivision 6b, clause (c), or
the reinstatement of a teacher holding a provisional license, other than a
vocational education license, contrary to the provisions of subdivision 6b,
clause (e). The provisions of section 179A.16 shall not apply for the pur-
poses of this subdivision.
MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6a.
393. See id.
394. Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 6b provides:
The school board may place on unrequested leave of absence, without pay
or fringe benefits, as many teachers as may be necessary because of discon-
tinuance of position, lack of pupils, financial limitations, or merger of classes
caused by consolidation of districts. The unrequested leave shall be effec-
tive at the close of the school year. In placing teachers on unrequested
leave, the board shall be governed by the following provisions:
(a) The board may place probationary teachers on unrequested leave
first in the inverse order of their employment. No teacher who has acquired
continuing contract rights shall be placed on unrequested leave of absence
while probationary teachers are retained in positions for which the teacher
who has acquired continuing contract rights is licensed;
(b) Teachers who have acquired continuing contract rights shall be
placed on unrequested leave of absence in fields in which they are licensed
in the inverse order in which they were employed by the school district. In
the case of equal seniority, the order in which teachers who have acquired
continuing contract rights shall be placed on unrequested leave of absence
in fields in which they are licensed shall be negotiable;
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (b), no teacher shall be
entitled to exercise any seniority when that exercise results in that teacher
being retained by the district in a field for which the teacher holds only a
provisional license, as defined by the board of teaching, unless that exercise
of seniority results in the placement on unrequested leave of absence of
another teacher who also holds a provisional license in the same field. The
provisions of this clause shall not apply to vocational education licenses;
(d) Notwithstanding clauses (a), (b) and (c), if the placing of a proba-
tionary teacher on unrequested leave before a teacher who has acquired
continuing rights, the placing of a teacher who had acquired continuing con-
tract rights on unrequested leave before another teacher who has acquired
continuing contract rights but who has greater seniority, or the restiction
imposed by the provisons of clause (c) would place the district in violation of
its affirmative action program, the district may retain the probationary
teacher, the teacher with less seniority, or the provisionally licensed teacher;
(e) Teachers placed on unrequested leave of absence shall be rein-
stated to the positions from which they have been given leaves of absence
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arisen in several cases where a negotiated unrequested leave of
absence plan has explicitly denied or not addressed statutory
rights contained in Minnesota Statutes section 125.12.
Although several recent cases have dealt with this subject, a
complete understanding of these recent developments would
be difficult without an understanding of the 1978 caseJerviss v.
Independent School District No. 294.39 5 Injerviss, an unrequested
leave of absence plan negotiated under subdivision 6a allowed
the school board to place teachers on an unrequested leave of
absence without notice of proposed placement on unrequested
leave of absence and without a hearing. The supreme court
was asked to determine whether the teacher should have been
afforded minimal due process rights.
396
TheJerviss court presented a lengthy analysis of the history
or, if not available, to other available positions in the school district in fields
in which they are licensed. Reinstatement shall be in the inverse order of
placement on leave of absence. No teacher shall be reinstated to a position
in a field in which the teacher holds only a provisional license, other than a
vocational education license, while another teacher who holds a nonprovi-
sional license in the same field remains on unrequested leave. The order of
reinstatement of teachers who have equal seniority and who are placed on
unrequested leave in the same school year shall be negotiable;
(f) No appointment of a new teacher shall be made while there is avail-
able, on unrequested leave, a teacher who is properly licensed to fill such
vacancy, unless the teacher fails to advise the school board within 30 days of
the date of notification that a position is available to that teacher, that he or
she may return to employment and that he or she will assume the duties of
the position to which appointed on a future date determined by the board;
(g) A teacher placed on unrequested leave of absence may engage in
teaching or any other occupation during the period of this leave;
(h) The unrequested leave of absence shall not impair the continuing
contract rights of a teacher or result in a loss of credit for previous years of
service;
(i) The unrequested leave of absence of a teacher who is placed on
unrequested leave of absence prior to January 1, 1978 and who is not rein-
stated shall continue for a period of two years after which the right to rein-
statement shall terminate. The unrequested leave of absence of a teacher
who is placed on unrequested leave of absence on or afterJanuary 1, 1978
and who is not reinstated shall continue for a period of five years, after
which the right to reinstatement shall terminate; provided the teacher's
right to reinstatement shall also terminate if he or she fails to file with the
board by April 1 of any year a written statement requesting reinstatement;
(j) The same provisions applicable to terminations of probationary or
continuing contracts in subdivisions 3 and 4 shall apply to placement on
unrequested leave of absence;
(k) Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to impair the rights
of teachers placed on unrequested leave of absence to receive unemploy-
ment compensation if otherwise eligible.
MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6b (1984).
395. 273 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1978).
396. Id. at 640-41. The teacher brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
reinstatement and back pay. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court
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of the adoption of subdivisions 6a and 6b. The court con-
cluded that provision for an optional negotiated leave of ab-
sence plan did not permit the negotiating parties to eliminate
pre-existing statutory rights. TheJerviss court stated:
Absent specific statutory authoritzation to omit procedures
including notice and a hearing prior to placement on unre-
quested leave of absence, therefore, the parties may not
adopt a plan that does not include such a procedure. Fur-
ther, if the plan merely omits any reference to such a proce-
dure, as is the case with the plan at issue here, the plan may
be read to incorporate the statutory requirement of subdivi-
sion 4 by implication.
397
The court ruled the teacher was entitled to notice of proposed
placement on unrequested leave of absence and a hearing. 398
In Atwood v. Independent School District No. 51, 39 9 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court addressed another conflict between the
provisions of subdivisions 6a and 6b. In Atwood, a negotiated
plan provided that teachers could be placed on unrequested
leave of absence without a hearing provided written notice was
given by April 1 of the school year prior to the commencement
of the leave of absence.400 Nevertheless, a teacher who re-
ceived notice requested a hearing. 40 1 The hearing was held on
May 17, 1982, and the teacher moved the hearing examiner to
dismiss the proceedings because a final decision had not been
rendered by April 1, as required under the bargaining agree-
ment.40 2 The hearing examiner rejected this objection and
recommended that the teacher be placed on unrequested leave
of absence. 40 3 This recommendation was adopted by the
school board, but the district court reversed.40 4 On appeal, the
supreme court determined which procedures the teacher
should have been afforded under these circumstances.40 5
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the Jerviss
granted the teacher's motion and held she was entitled to notice and a hearing as
provided in Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 4. See id. at 641.
397. Id. at 645.
398. See id. at 646. The supreme court stated that a teacher should not be denied
notice and a hearing without a clear legislative mandate. Id.
399. 354 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 1984).
400. Id. at 11.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. The district court decided the negotiated plan required the post-hearing
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decision. UnderJerviss, the Atwood court stated, "the presence
of a plan negotiated under Minn. Stat. § 125.12, subd. 6a
(1982), does not abrogate or eliminate any other statutory
rights under section 125.12."406
Applying this rule, the Atwood court held the teacher had a
right to demand a hearing even if the negotiated agreement
did not provide for one. In applying this rule, however, the
supreme court held that the April 1 deadline contained in the
negotiated plan was waived by the teacher when the teacher
requested a hearing under section 125.12, subdivision 6b of
Minnesota Statutes.
40 7
Apparently, Atwood allows a teacher to reject a negotiated
plan in favor of the statutory procedures contained in subdivi-
sion 6b. It is important to note that this holding was applied to
a procedural matter and not to substantive provisions con-
tained in the negotiated plan. Thus, there remain several un-
answered questions regarding the extent to which the statutory
6b provision will override substantive provisions contained in
a 6a plan.
In dictum, Ruter v. Independent School District No. 34408 ex-
pounded upon the supreme court's holding in Jerviss. The
Ruter court indicated, "Where a negotiated plan fails to incor-
porate a procedure authorized by the general unrequested
leave statute and also does not explicitly disallow the statutory
safeguards, the plan 'may be read to incorporate the statutory
requirement... by implication.' -409 The court, however, ulti-
mately relied upon the explicit terms of the negotiated teach-
ers' contract by concluding the negotiated plan also permitted
conclusion of the school board to be completed by April 1. The process was not
completed until May 25. See id.
406. Id. at 12. The supreme court noted that Atwood did not involve a school
board failure to comply with section 125.12, but involved actual compliance with sec-
tion 125.12 and an attempt to comply with the collective bargaining agreement's
terms. See id.
407. See id. at 13. When waiver occurs, "school boards are required only to ob-
serve the procedural requirements under section 125.12, unless some prejudice is
established." Id.
408. 364 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), petition for rev. denied (Minn.June 14,
1985). The teacher was employed full-time at a vocational school and served as a
technical tutor. His position as tutor was cut. He was granted a hearing regarding
his seniority under a different position, but was denied reinstatement. Id. at 823-24.
409. Id. at 826 n.2 (quoting Jerviss, 273 N.W.2d at 645). The court of appeals
noted that the statutory plan would permit the teacher to bump a less senior teacher.
See id.
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the teacher to take the position of a less senior teacher.41 0
Peck v. Independent School District No. 164 1 addressed the rela-
tionship of subdivisons 6a and 6b when dealing with substan-
tive aspects of the unrequested leave of absence statute. The
negotiated 6a plan in Peck allowed the school district to place a
more senior teacher on unrequested leave of absence even if
the teacher was licensed to teach a particular subject but had
not taught that subject in the school district. Without men-
tioningJerviss, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated:
Subd. 6a authorizes the parties to negotiate a seniority pol-
icy and procedures to reduce teaching staff when necessary.
Subd. 6b does not apply where, as here, the parties have
reached an agreement. Subd. 6b does not require that
teachers, in addition to being licensed in a subject, also
have successfully taught that subject. But a negotiated un-
requested leave plan may waive rights afforded to teachers
under 6b.
4 12
The Peck court concluded, therefore, that continuing contract
teachers had "the right to bump a probationary teacher only if
they [had] successfully taught the subject matter.
'" 4 13
410. See id. at 826.
411. 348 N.W.2d 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
412. Id. at 103.
413. Id. The negotiated plan gave no preference to continuing contract teachers
over probationary teachers. Contrarily, subdivision 6b provides:
The board may place probationary teachers on unrequested leave first in the
inverse order of their employment. No teacher who has acquired continu-
ing contract rights shall be placed on unrequested leave of absence while
probationary teachers are retained in positions for which the teacher who
has acquired continuing contract rights is licensed....
MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 6b(a).
The Ruter decision was later held to be resjudicata against the less senior teacher
in the subsequent case Pirrotta v. Independent School Dist. No. 347, 381 N.W.2d 55
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Although Pirrotta was not a party to the original lawsuit, the
court of appeals held his interests were adequately represented by the school district.
Id. at 57. The supreme court later reversed that decision and held a lack of privity
between Pirrotta and the school district disallowed any collateral estoppel. See Pir-
rotta, No. C9-85-1490 (Minn. Nov. 7, 1986), rev' 381 N.W.2d 55 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986). The supreme court further stated:
Until the legislature may act, we hold that at the second stage of a hear-
ing to place teacher A on unrequested leave, i.e., at the stage where teacher
A is claiming a right to bump teacher B, the school district should give no-
tice to teacher B that he or she may intervene to protect their seniority
rights, and that failure to intervene will be deemed acquiescence in the
school district's action. In some schools, especially those with large facul-
ties, bumping teacher B may cause further bumping, which may require fur-
ther invitations to intervene, but, even so, it would seem the best way to
avoid serial hearings is to provie one hearing, if possible, at which all con-
cerned can be heared. Ordinarily, the relative seniority rights of the faculty
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In a consistent decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court up-
held the negotiated plan. In Blank v. Independent School District
No. 16, 4 14 a teacher of visually handicapped children whose po-
sition was being discontinued claimed she was also entitled to
seniority as a mainstream elementary education teacher. The
school board, however, had already placed the teacher on pro-
posed unrequested leave of absence. 415
The parties' collective bargaining agreement required post-
ing of a seniority list each school year.4 16 Any teacher dis-
agreeing with the list was to provide a written challenge within
twenty working days.4 17 The school district was given ten
working days to respond and any revised seniority list was to
be binding upon the parties. 4 18
are not in dispute, so in most cases teacher B may choose not to intervene;
but when disputes do arise, as here, a hearing at which both affected teach-
ers may appear should be provided.
Id., slip op. at 6.
414. 393 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1986), rev'k 372 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
415. Id. at 649. The teacher testified at her unrequested leave hearing that her
experience with handicapped children together with her license in elementary educa-
tion gave her seniority to bump a less senior elementary education teacher. Id.
416. Id.
417. See id. at n.2.
418. Id. The Independent School District No. 16 and the Spring Lake Park Feder-
ation of Teachers Local 1355 had negotiated a plan providing for unrequested leave
of absence. That plan included the following seniority list requirements:
15.05 Establishment of Seniority List
(A) The school district shall cause a seniority list (by
name, date of employment, qualification and subject matter or
field) to be prepared from its records. It shall thereupon post
such list in an official place in each school building of the dis-
trict no later than December 15 of each year.
(B) Any person whose name appears on such list and who
may disagree with the findings of the school board and the or-
der of seniority in said list shall have twenty (20) working days
from the date of posting to supply written documentation,
proof and request for seniority change to the school board.
(C) Within ten (10) working days hereafter, the school
district shall evaluate any and all such written communications
regarding the order of seniority contained in said list and may
make such changes the school district deems warranted. A final
seniority list shall thereupon be prepared by the school district,
which list as revised shall be binding on the school district and
any teacher. Each year thereafter the school district shall cause
such seniority list to be updated to reflect any addition of or
deletion of personnel caused by retirement, death, resignation,
other cessation of services, or new employees. Such yearly re-
vised list shall govern the application of the unrequested leave
of absence policy until thereafter revised.
(D) Effect: This Article shall be effective at the beginning
date of this master contract and shall be governed by its dura-
tion clause. This Article shall govern all teachers as defined
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In Blank, the posted seniority list stated the teacher was "li-
censed for visual handicapped K-12." 41 9 She did not object to
the list within twenty days but raised the issue regarding multi-
ple qualifications at her unrequested leave hearing. The hear-
ing examiner concluded the teacher was not qualified to bump
an elementary teacher under the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and recommended placement on unre-
quested leave. The school board adopted the hearing
examiner's recommendation.
4 20
The supreme court, in a 4-3 decision, agreed with the school
board's decision and reversed the district court and the court
of appeals, which had ordered the teacher's reinstatement. 421
The supreme court stated the basis for its decision:
Treating the seniority list as final and binding on the par-
ties by reason of the failure to grieve, in timely fashion, the
omission of licensure in a subject matter category may seem
a harsh penalty indeed for the failure to perform what some
would characterize as a technical requirement. The neces-
sity for bringing a grievance is, however, clearly spelled out
in the collective bargaining agreement. Had the seniority
list shown respondent as licensed in both elementary educa-
tion and to teach the visually impaired so that the defect -
the absence of any reference to subject matter categories
which a teacher had successfully taught within the district -
therein and shall not be construed to limit the rights of any
other licensed employee not covered by the master contract or
other master contract affecting such licensed employee.
Id. at 649.
419. Id. at 650. Both the teacher and the school district agree that "licensed for"
is to be read as "licensed for and have successfully taught," to which the supreme
court replied that "these arguments give ground for the shocking inference that
school administrators cannot write plain English and teachers cannot read it.
Id. at 651.
420. Id. at 649.
421. Id. at 648. The court of appeals held the posted seniority list did not con-
form to the format required by the collective bargaining agreement because it failed
to list a teacher's subject matter or field. Therefore, the teacher was not bound to
use the grievance procedure. See Blank, 372 N.W.2d at 389. The supreme court dis-
sent, written by Justice Yetka and joined by Justices Scott and Wahl, agreed with the
court of appeals majority, stating in part:
As the lower courts found, the difference between the contract and the list
was sufficient to render the agreement incomplete and non-binding, thereby
allowing Blank to challenge the list at the ULA hearing and at the district
court level. The publication of a seniority list exactly as described in the
Master Agreement was a condition precedent to Blank's duty to register an
objection within 20 working days or to begin grievance procedures.
Blank, 393 N.W.2d at 653 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
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lulled respondent into a false sense of security, the issue
and, no doubt, the result here, would be quite different.
Here, it is the teacher's neglect to follow the grievance pro-
cedure which permitted a disputed seniority list to become
final.
4 22
Blank demonstrates that subdivision 6a plans may restrict a
teacher's procedural ability to challenge placement on unre-
quested leave of absence. While that point is clear, the deci-
sion raises other unanswered issues such as what forum for
review is available if a teacher properly grieves and is neverthe-
less improperly placed on unrequested leave.
In Blank, the collective bargaining agreement provided for
arbitration of disputes regarding "interpretation of terms and
conditions of employment covered by the agreement." 423 In
the absence of such a provision, it is unclear whether the
supreme court intends review of the grievance decision by an
independent hearing examiner. If not, the school district's res-
olution of the grievance might not be subject to judicial review.
Recent cases discussing the relationship between subdivi-
sions 6a and 6b leave unanswered questions regarding waiver
of subdivision 6b statutory rights when negotiating a plan
under subdivision 6a. It appears procedural rights are not for-
feited but substantive rights may be waived. Thus, in the fu-
ture courts will be forced to distinguish substance from
procedure in yet another context. In this respect, the court of
appeals' discussion in Peck seems most consistent with legisla-
tive intent.
E. Hiring
In Cybyske v. Independent School District No. 196,424 the supreme
court considered the actions available to a teacher who claimed
422. Blank, 393 N.W.2d at 652. The supreme court also suggested, regardless of
her failure to follow the grievance procedure, that the teacher had not successfully
taught as a mainstream elementary teacher. See id. at 652-53.
423. Blank, 372 N.W.2d at 391 (Lansing, J., dissenting).
424. 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 330 (1984). In 1979,
Cybyske's husband was elected to the school board in a neighboring school district.
Later that year, Cybyske was hired by Independent School District No. 196 as a long-
term substitute teacher. In 1980, she applied for a new fifth grade teaching position
in Independent School District No. 196. She was not hired to the position because of
her husband's strong pro-teacher stance in his position on the neighboring school
board. See id. at 258-59. For an excellent analysis of the case, see Note, Employment
Discrimination Based On Marital Status, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 277 (1985).
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she was not hired by a school district because of her husband's
pro-teacher positions while acting on another school board.
The supreme court first held the teacher did not have an action
under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 425 The court held
that failure to hire a teacher because of the teacher's husband's
political views did not constitute marital status discrimina-
tion.426 Recognizing some states construe the term marital sta-
tus to encompass the identity or situation of a job applicant's
spouse, the supreme court held this broad interpretation was
also intended by the Minnesota Legislature.427 The court
made clear, however, that under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act marital status discrimination exists only where the discrim-
ination is "directed at the institution of marriage itself."
4 28
The Cybyske court next considered whether the teacher
stated a cause of action under section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code. The teacher claimed her constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and association had been violated
by the school board's decision not to hire her because of her
husband's political views. 429 The court discussed the funda-
mental right to marriage and concluded the teacher had stated
a cause of action under section 1983 stating, "the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's section
425. See Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 259-61; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.14 (1984)
(Minnesota Human Rights Act).
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an
unfair employment practice:
(2) For an employer, because of race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, membership
or activity in a local commission, disability, or age,
(a) to refuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment which un-
reasonably excludes a person seeking employment; or
(c) to discriminate against a person with respect to his hire, tenure,
compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of
employment.
MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1, quoted in Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 259 (emphasis added).
426. See Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 261.
427. See id. at 259-61.
428. Id. at 261. The supreme court distinguished Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d
386 (Minn. 1979). Kraft involved a company policy which prohibited hiring an appli-
cant whose spouse was already an employee. The Kraft court found the antinepotism
employment rule to be marital status discrimination. See Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 387.
The Cybyske court adhered to its broad construction of marital status found in Kraft,
but concluded the political status of one's spouse is not protected under the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act. See Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 261.
429. Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 261-62.
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1983 claim for deprivation of her constitutional right of free-
dom of association." 43
0
This case leaves unresolved the central question whether a
school district can base its refusal to hire on the views of the
teacher's spouse. While a cause of action does not exist under
the Human Rights Act, a cause of action can be filed under
section 1983. Further litigation must determine whether a
specific action will be successful.
V. ARBITRATION
A. Generally
In Cloquet Education Association v. Independent School District No.
94,431 the school district assigned a teacher to chaperone a se-
nior high school dance. The teacher claimed the increased
time caused by this assignment was a change in the condition
of employment and sought arbitration.432 The supreme court
held the assignment of a teacher to an additional out-of-class
activity affected the teacher's hours of service, thereby affect-
ing the terms and conditions of employment.433 Under the
collective bargaining agreement, therefore, the teacher had as-
serted a grievance subject to compulsory binding
arbitration. 43 4
In Mora Federation of Teachers v. Independent School District No.
332,435 the court of appeals was asked whether a union, as a
teacher's bargaining representative, could file a class grievance
430. Id. at 263. The supreme court stated Cybyske could "prevail if she can estab-
lish that the decision of the public employer not to hire her was made because of her
exercise of constitutionally protected rights and freedoms." Id. at 262. The court
thought Cybyske's action might be enforceable. See id. (citing Sullivan v. Meade In-
dep. School Dist. No. 101, 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976)).
431. 344 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1984).
432. See id. at 417.
433. See id. at 418.
434. Id. The school disrict argued that assigning chaperones was an exercise of
"inherent managerial right" and therefore excluded from mandatory grievance arbi-
tration under the parties' master contract and PELRA, Minnesota Statutes section
179.66, subdivision 1. The supreme court disagreed. See id.
435. 352 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In Mora, a 185-day teacher duty
calendar had been adopted, but did not include a computer workshop held prior to
the school year. After protest, the teachers' union filed a class action grievance
against the school district. The union's request for arbitration was denied by the
school district and the union petitioned the district court. The district court denied
the union's motion to compel arbitration based on a lack of standing. See id. at 490-
91.
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under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The
court of appeals held issues of standing to file a grievance, ad-
herence to grievance procedures, and the arbitrability of the
dispute were all issues that should have been submitted to an
arbitrator for resolution. 436 Where there is an intent to arbi-
trate and the contested issues are reasonably debatable, those
issues will be subject to arbitration. 437
The contested issue was held not reasonably debatable in
Berger v. Independent School District No. 706.438 In Berger, the
school district and the teacher disputed whether the procedure
for placing teachers on unrequested leave "was a negotiated
term of the contract and, as such, subject to arbitration, or
whether it was grounded in something outside the con-
tract." 439 The court of appeals concluded the parties' clear in-
tent under the collective bargaining contract was to invoke the
statutorily-prescribed procedures for an unrequested leave of
absence hearing.440 The teacher properly contested his senior-
ity ranking at the hearing and did not waive his right to contest
by not initiating arbitration. 44'
The Minnesota Supreme Court also denied the applicability
of arbitration in Duluth Federation of Teachers, Local 692 v. In-
dependent School District No. 709.442 The teachers' union sought
to compel arbitration regarding computation of seniority for
teachers seeking reemployment. The supreme court stated the
collective bargaining agreement specifically prohibited an arbi-
trator from determining the lawfulness of the agreement.443
Because the issue of whether Minnesota Statutes section
125.17, subdivision 11 was properly applied to compute sen-
iority involved the lawfulness of the agreement, the supreme
436. See Mora, 352 N.W.2d 489.
437. See id. at 493. The court of appeals found the language in the collective bar-
gaining agreement to be ambiguous. The matter was, therefore, remanded to the
arbitrator for determination of standing and prior adherence to grievance proce-
dures. See id.
438. 362 N.W.2d 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
439. Id. at 372. If a plan for placing teachers on unrequested leave is not negoti-
ated pursuant to section 125.12, subdivision 6a of Minnesota Statutes, then the statu-
tory plan pursuant to subdivision 6b applies. See id.
440. See id.
441. The court of appeals held the parties did not intend to arbitrate and, there-
fore, the challenge to seniority was properly raised at the leave of absence hearing
pursuant to section 125.12, subdivision 6b of Minnesota Statutes. See id. at 372-73.
442. 361 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1985).
443. See id. at 836.
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court concluded a court proceeding was the proper forum for
the dispute.44
4
In AFSCME District Council 96 v. Independent School District No.
381, 4 4 5 the court of appeals established standards for the re-
view of an arbitrator's decision. The court of appeals held its
review of an arbitrator's decision would be very limited, stat-
ing, "When the parties have agreed to avail themselves of the
benefits of arbitration, judicial interference should be kept to a
minimum. For that reason, the standard to be applied in re-
viewing arbitration awards is deferential for the arbitrator's de-
cision . "..."446
The court went on to explain, "Even if we were to disagree
with the arbitrator's decision, it is of no consequence because
the arbitrator's construction of the parties' agreement ... was
bargained for; not the interpretation of this court." 447 An arbi-
trator's decision will be upheld if the arbitrator acted within his
authority in deciding the arbitrated issue. 448
These recent cases emphasize the difference between legal
issues and contested factual issues. Questions of law are prop-
erly determined by the court. Arbitration is the proper forum
for reasonably debatable issues regarding the employment re-
lationship and arbitrability of the dispute. No drastic changes
in judicial principle have emerged.
B. Bargaining Units
The definition of a bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining occasionally produces confusion. When an issue
arises, petition is made to the Bureau of Mediation Services
(BMS). A BMS decision is appealed to the Public Employment
444. Id. The supreme court concluded that the issue was one the parties intended
to be excluded from arbitration and, therefore, arbitration could not be compelled.
See id.
445. 351 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), petition for rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 12,
1984). In AFSCME, four teachers sought to revise a seniority list to reflect date of
hire, not date ofjoining the union. The school board agreed, but the union filed a
grievance and the matter went to arbitration. Relying on the collective bargaining
agreement, the arbitrator ruled the list would not be revised. The disrict court af-
firmed the arbitrator's decision. See id. at 34-35.
446. Id. at 35 (citing Carlstrom v. Independent School Dist. No. 77, 256 N.W.2d
479, 483 (Minn. 1977)).
447. Id. (quoting Ramsey County v. AFSCME, 309 N.W.2d 785, 793 (Minn.
1983)).
448. Id.
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Relations Board (PERB). Any further appeal from that agency
is heard by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Two recent cases
have reached that stage, forcing the court of appeals to apply
PELRA to determine bargaining unit classification.
In Hibbing Education Association v. Public Employment Relations
Board ,'4 4 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court decided whether
PELRA requires the PERB and the BMS to consider the job
functions of employees in making bargaining unit determina-
tions for teacher bargaining units.450 The BMS and the PERB
had established separate bargaining units for teachers and Ti-
tle I paraprofessionals. 45 1 The supreme court agreed with this
classification and reversed the court of appeals, which had or-
dered PERB to consider job functions.
452
The supreme court based its analysis on the definition of
"teacher" in PELRA, which distinguishes the units based on
required licensure, and not job function. 4 53  The supreme
court held the broad definition of "teacher" in the Minnesota
Teacher Tenure Act was not applicable.
454
449. 369 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 1985), rev'g 346 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
450. Hibbing Educ. Ass'n, 369 N.W.2d at 530.
451. Id. at 528. Title I paraprofessionals are hired to "supplement regular class-
room instruction of certain elementary school students performing at a level of one-
half year to one year behind their classmates in reading and mathematics." Id.
452. See Hibbing Educ. Ass'n, 369 N.W.2d at 530. The court of appeals decided the
PERB and BMS had relied on an erroneous theory of law in declining to consider
whether the paraprofessionals' actual job duties included teaching. Hibbing Educ.
Ass'n, 346 N.W.2d at 391. The court of appeals stated:
In this case, PERB procedures denied the Hibbing paraprofessionals
entrance to a unit of people who are in many ways doing the exact work of
the paraprofessionals. This determination procedure allows the school dis-
trict to unilaterally manipulate the composition of the bargaining unit to its
benefit by setting the qualifications for the job. The school district gets the
benefit of the paraprofessionals performing teaching functions, yet denies
them the advantage of being a part of the teachers' bargaining unit.
Hibbing Educ. Ass'n, 346 N.W.2d at 391.
453. "Teacher" means any public employee other than a superintendent or
assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or a supervisory or
confidential employee, employed by a school district: (1) in a position for
which the person must be licensed by the board of teaching or the state board of educa-
tion; or (2) in a position as a physical therapist or an occupational therapist.
Hibbing Educ. Ass'n, 369 N.W.2d at 529 (emphasis added) (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 179A.03, subd. 18).
454. See id. at 530. The Teacher Tenure Act states:
The term "teacher" includes every person regularly employed, as a
principal, or to give instruction in a classroom, or to superintend or super-
vise classroom instruction, or as placement teacher and visiting teacher.
Persons regularly employed as counselors and school librarians shall be cov-
ered by these sections as teachers if licensed as teachers or as school
librarians.
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In Independent School District No. 721 v. School Services Employees,
Local 284, 4 55 the court of appeals determined how to calculate
a "normal work week" for purposes of PELRA, which does not
apply to part-time employees who work less than 35% of the
normal work week. 456 The case involved twelve cooks, six of
whom worked thirty-five hour weeks and six of whom worked
ten hour weeks. The BMS decided the latter six were excluded
from the bargaining unit. The PERB reversed. 457
The court of appeals held "the 'normal work week' is to be
calculated by reference to the normal, predominant work week
of the full time employees of the bargaining unit. . . ."458 The
calculation is not made "by averaging the actual hours worked
by all employees doing bargaining-unit work in the particular
unit." 459 The court of appeals' calculation tends to exclude
workers from PELRA's umbrella.
In fashioning PELRA, the Minnesota legislature clearly
meant to exclude some part time employees from coverage
under the Act. The legislature was concerned with main-
taining the integrity of bargaining units by excluding part
time workers who tend to have little in common with full
time workers. The existence of conflicting interests among
workers can undermine the ability of a unit to bargain
effectively. 460
MINN. STAT. § 125.17, subd. 1(a).
In Sweeney v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 368 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985), the court of appeals applied the broad definition of teacher in section 125.17
to hold the three-year probationary period under section 125.17, subdivision 3 is a
single period not subject to recalculation when an individual is promoted from a
teaching position to an administrative principal position. Id. at 291.
455. 379 N.W.2d 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), petition for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 14,
1986).
456. "Public employee" or "employee" means any person appointed or em-
ployed by a public employer except:
(e) part-time employees whose service does not exceed the lesser of 14
hours per week or 35 percent of the normal work week in the employee's
appropriate unit.
MINN. STAT. § 179A.03, subd. 14(e).
457. Independent School Dist. No. 721, 379 N.W.2d at 673.
458. Id. at 674. "In this case, that would mean that the 'normal work week' is 35
hours. Thirty-five percent of 35 hours is 12.5 hours. Thus, the six cooks who worked
ten hours per week were excluded from the bargaining unit." Id.
459. Id. "In this case, that would mean that the 'normal work week' is 221/2 hours.
Thirty-five percent of 221/ is 7.88 hours. Thus, the six cooks who worked ten hours
per week were included in the bargining unit by PERB." Id.
460. Id.
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The court of appeals believed its holding was necessary to ef-
fectuate legislative intent and to prevent conflicts of interest
within the bargaining unit.4
6 1
Proper bargaining unit membership enhances collective bar-
gaining by maintaining bargaining unit integrity. The Minne-
sota Legislature by enacting PELRA provided guidance
regarding bargaining unit identity. These cases demonstrate
how Minnesota courts resolve membership disputes to avoid
internal bargaining unit conflicts.
VI. APPEAL AND DAMAGES
A. Forum for Appeals-Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
With the implementation of the new Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals in November 1983,462 many uncertainties were created
concerning the appropriate forum for review of school board
actions. Applicable statutes did not directly address whether
review of school board actions would be in district court or
instead be reviewed in the court of appeals.463
In In re Pinkney464 and Schmidt v. Independent School District No.
1,465 the court of appeals reviewed school board actions with-
out specifically addressing the jurisdictional issue. In Schmidt,
the Minnesota Supreme Court issued an order quashing a writ
of certiorari issued by the district court and permitted discre-
tionary review by the court of appeals. 466
The issue was squarely presented in Strand v. Special School
District No. 1.467 In Strand, however, the school district sought a
writ of prohibition from the Minnesota Supreme Court before
the court of appeals issued its decision. The court of appeals
decided the appeal on the merits without deciding the jurisdic-
tional issue. 468 In dictum, the court of appeals stated its opin-
461. Id.
462. See COURT OF APPEALS ACT, ch. 501, §§ 3-25, 1982 Minn. Laws 569, 570-81
(codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 480A.01-. 11 (1984) and scattered sections).
463. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § § 125.12, subd. 11 ("judicial review" of teacher termi-
nations); 125.606 (writ of certiorari); see also MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 120.01 (extraordi-
nary writs).
464. 353 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
465. 349 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
466. See Schmidt, No. C3-83-1691 (Minn. Oct. 31, 1983) (order quashing writ of
certiorari and permitting discretionary review).
467. 361 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 392
N.W.2d 881, (Minn. 1986).
468. See id. at 72.
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ion that it was intended to review school board actions.469 The
supreme court later denied the writ of prohibition. 470
The court of appeals clarified jurisdiction in two subsequent
cases. In Brandhorst v. Special School District No. 1,471 the court of
appeals concluded that it has jurisdiction to hear appeals from
teacher termination proceedings. The court cited the supreme
court's order denying the writ of prohibition in Strand, and its
assumption ofjurisdiction in Pinkney, settling the jurisdictional
issue.472 In Grinolds v. Independent School District No. 597,473 the
court of appeals made clear that its jurisdiction to review
school board decisions is exclusive and that district courts may
no longer issue writs of certiorari for these actions. 474
Although amendment of Minnesota Statutes section
480A.06, subdivision 3, in 1985 established court of appeals
"jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to all agencies, public
corporations and public officials," 475 the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in 1986, clarified appropriate review of school board ac-
tions. In Strand,476 the supreme court stated:
Neither our unpublished order in Schmidt nor the court of
appeals' decision in Pinkney is binding on this court. Now,
however, we take this opportunity to conclude that it was
the intention of the legislature and this court in its rulemak-
ing capacity to vest certiorari jurisdiction for cases of this
nature in the court of appeals. The creation of the court of
469. "While we are of the opinion it was intended the court of appeals consider
appellate matters of this type, removing appellate review from the trial courts, we do
not now address this issue because it is before the Supreme Court." Id.
470. Strand v. Special School Dist. No. 1, No. CI-84-1912 (Minn. Nov. 29, 1984).
471. 365 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd 392 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1986).
472. Id. at 385.
473. 366 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
474. "We see no need to analyze this point any futher. Jurisdiction to hear ap-
peals from school board actions lies with the court of appeals, and not the district
courts." Id. at 668.
475. The amended subdivision 3 provides:
The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to all
agencies, public corporations and public officials, except the tax court and
workers' compensation court of appeals. The court of appeals shall have
jurisdiction to review decisions of the commissioner of economic security,
pursuant to section 268.10.
Act of May 20, 1985, ch. 165, § 1, 1985 Minn. Laws 452 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 480A.06, subd. 3 (Supp. 1985)). See, e.g., Voettiner v. Commissioner of Educ., 376
N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (writ of certiorari issued pursuant to Minne-
sota Statutes section 480A.06, subdivision 3 to review denial of a teaching application
when no right to a contested case hearing existed).
476. 392 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. 1986).
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appeals precipitated numerous statutory and appellate rule
amendments which generally substituted that court for the
district court in those areas in which the latter court acted in
an appellate capacity. The fact that this area of review, as
well as designated other areas, was omitted must be viewed
as an oversight, ultimately corrected by the 1985 amend-
ment to Minn. Stat. § 480A.06, subd. 3.477
This conclusion and the statutory amendment established the
court of appeals' exclusive jurisdiction to issue writs of certio-
rari to review school district matters.
478
B. Standard of Review
The standard of review on appeal is often stated as follows:
The nature of judicial review in a certiorari proceeding
under Minn. Stat. § 125.12 is limited. The school board's
decision to terminate a teacher will not be heard de novo
and will not be set aside by a reviewing court unless the de-
cision is fraudulent, arbitrary, unreasonable, not supported
by substantial evidence on the record, not within the school
board's jurisdiction or based on an erroneous theory of
law.
4 79
Only decisions falling within the applicable standard of review
will be reversed. The court of appeals does not have "liberty
to hear the case de novo and substitute its findings for those of
the school board."
480
Great deference is given to the school board's or the hearing
examiner's position and opportunity to see and hear witnesses
and to judge credibility. 48I This substantial deference is dis-
solved only by manifest injustice or insubstantial evidence.
4 82
To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding,
477. Id. at 883.
478. In a companion case, the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' certio-
rari jurisdiction. See Brandhorst, 392 N.W.2d at 888-89.
479. Peck v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 348 N.W.2d 100, 101 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984); see Ganyo v. Independent School Dist. No. 832, 311 N.W.2d 497 (Minn.
1981); Kroll v. Independent School Dist. No. 593, 304 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1981).
480. Krol, 304 N.W.2d at 342; see Grinolds v. Independent School Dist. No. 597,
346 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Minn. 1984).
481. See Russell v. Special School Dist. No. 6, 366 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (citing Fisher v. Independent School Dist. No. 622, 357 N.W.2d 152, 155
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
482. See Downie v. Independent School Dist. No. 141, 367 N.W.2d 913, 916
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985), petition for rev. denied (Minn. July 26, 1985).
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the entire record must be reviewed. 483 Insubstantial evidence
will be found only when reasonable minds could not possibly
find a basis for drawing the given conclusions. 48 4 Whether the
appellate court would have reached a different conclusion is
not controlling.
C. Attorney Fees and Costs
In Sweeney v. Special School District No. 1,485 the court of ap-
peals held demotion of tenured teachers without notice and
hearing violated section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States
Code, thereby entitling the teachers to an award of attorney
fees under section 1988.486 Because the trial court did not
make specific findings of fact to justify the amount of fees
awarded, the matter was remanded. 487 In providing guidance
to the trial court, the court of appeals established a framework
for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees.488 In Rob-
ertson v. Special School District No. 1489 and State ex rel. Dreyer v.
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 542,490 the
483. Id. (citing Kroll, 304 N.W.2d at 342).
484. Id. (citing Kroll, 304 N.W.2d at 343).
Substanital evidence is:
1. Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion;
2. More than a scintilla of evidence;
3. More than some evidence;
4. More than any evidence; and
5. Evidence considered in its entirety.
Kelly v. Independent School Dist. No. 623, 380 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986). Compare Bye v. Special Intermediate School Dist. No. 916, 379 N.W.2d 653
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding substantial evidence supported conclusion financial
limitations warranted placement on unrequested leave of absence), petition for rev. de-
nied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1986) with Pinkney, 366 N.W.2d at 364-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(school board failed to base its decision on sufficient evidence).
485. 368 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
486. See id. at 291-92. Section 1983 provides liability for "the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982); see id. § 1988 (granting of attorney fees).
487. See Sweeney, 368 N.W.2d at 292.
488. See id. "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a rea-
sonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate." Id. Whether a higher or lower fee should be awarded must be deter-
mined in reference to the result obtained. If the relief achieved is exceptional or
limited in nature, an appropriate deviation should be made to reflect that relation-
ship. Id.
489. 347 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1984) (district court is accorded broad discre-
tion in awarding costs and disbursements).
490. 344 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. 1984) (bad faith contention not sustained;
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supreme court affirmed the district court's denial of costs. 49 1
Both cases demonstrate the trial court's broad discretion in
awarding costs and fees.
D. Reinstatement Wages
In Minnesota, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
125.12, subdivision 11, wrongfully discharged teachers receive
full back pay upon reinstatement.492 In Pearson v. School Board
of Independent School District No. 381,493 the court of appeals ana-
lyzed the requirements of subdivision 11. A district court had
awarded back pay in compliance with subdivision 11, except
the district court excluded twelve months pay prior to its order
because it believed the school district was not solely responsi-
ble for delays that occurred after the teacher's termination.
494
The court of appeals held the trial court erred because subdivi-
sion 11 required the teacher to receive "all compensation with-
held as a result of the termination or dismissal order." 495
The court also held the teacher's back pay must be reduced
by "any amounts arising from respondent's duty to mitigate
damages." 496 Thus, a wrongfully dismissed teacher is under a
duty to mitigate damages, and wages or other income earned
during the period of wrongful dismissal will reduce the amount
of back pay received upon reinstatement.
In a slightly different context, the supreme court held Min-
nesota Statutes section 181.13, 497 which requires payment of
therefore denial of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
549.21 proper).
491. Id.
492. The pendency of judicial proceedings shall not be grounds for post-
ponement of the effective date of the school board's order, but if judicial
review eventuates in reinstatement of the teacher, the board shall pay the
teacher all compensation withheld as a result of the termination or dismissal
order.
MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 11.
493. 356 N.W.2d 438, 441-42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
494. See id.
495. MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subd. 11.
496. Pearson, 356 N.W.2d at 442 (citing Soules v. Independent School Dist. No.
518, 258 N.W.2d 103, 105-08 (Minn. 1977); Stevens v. School Board of Indep.
School Dist. No. 271, 296 Minn. 413, 415, 208 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1973)).
497. When any person, firm, company, association, or corporation employing
labor within this state discharges a servant or employee, the wages or com-
missions actually earned and unpaid at the time of the discharge shall be-
come immediately due and payable upon demand of the employee. If the
employee's earned wages and commissions are not paid within 24 hours af-
ter such demand, whether the employment was by the day, hour, week,
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wages due within twenty-four hours after demand if an em-
ployee is discharged, applies to school districts. In Robert-
son,498 the school district discharged a teacher and failed to
comply with the teacher's request to pay his wages due.
499
Although the district did not have the authority to pay the
wages within the statutory twenty-four hour period, the
supreme court upheld the district court's award of penalty for
failure to comply with the twenty-four hour requirement con-
tained in section 181.13.500
The court of appeals has established its jurisdiction to re-
view school board actions by writ of certiorari. In reviewing
school board decisions, the court is bound to defer to the
school board's broad discretion. A trial court's award of attor-
ney fees, costs, or reinstatement wages will also be given sub-
stantial deference. Litigants must make a strong showing of
clear error to overcome a lower forum's unfavorable ruling.
CONCLUSION
The sweeping path of recent Minnesota education law has
forged radical changes in certain areas and consistently ex-
panded others. Although summary can be made of recent de-
velopments, many questions remain unanswered. Only future
month, or piece or by commissions, the discharged employee may charge
and collect the amount of his or her average daily earnings at the rate
agreed upon in the contract of employment, for such period, not exceeding
15 days, after the expiration of the 24 hours, as the employer is in default,
until full payment or other settlement, satisfactory to the discharged em-
ployee, is made .... The wages and commissions must be paid at the usual
place of payment unless the employee requests that the wages and commis-
sions be sent to him or her through the mails. If, in accordance with a re-
quest by the employee, the employee's wages and commissions are sent to
the employee through the mail, the wages and commissions shall be deemed
to have been paid as of the date of their postmark for the pruposes of this
section.
MINN. STAT. § 181.13 (1984).
498. 347 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 1984).
499. See id. at 266.
500. See id. at 268. The court stated:
There is no statutory exception providing school districts with a special
time period for paying discharged employees their wages. The administra-
tive delay here, whether necessary or not, does not operate to create an
exception to the statute. As a practical matter, the school board may wish to
direct the attention of the legislature to the situation where it is powerless to
comply with the demand for payment by an employee without first seeking
board approval for the disbursement of funds and it is difficult to call the
board together to satisfy the statutory time limitation.
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litigants and forthcoming opinions will answer these questions.
Practitioners should remain alert to further developments in
education law and derive their own forecasts for prospective
expansion.
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